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2016
Fiebich, Anika (2016): Pluralism, social cognition, and interaction in autism. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2), S. 161-184. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1261394

Abstract: In this paper, I investigate social cognition and its relation to interaction in autism from the perspective of a pluralist account of social understanding by considering behavioral as well as neuroscientific findings. Traditionally, researchers have focused on mental state reasoning in autism, which is uncontroversially impaired. A pluralist account of social cognition aims to explore the varieties of social understanding that are acquired throughout ontogeny and may play a role in everyday life. The analysis shows that children with autism are well able to understand other people's behavior by considering social rules and norms, scripts, and stereotypes. Moreover, some individuals with autism succeed in understanding other people's behavior in terms of mental states by employing explicit behavioral rules as a compensatory strategy. The paper ends with a discussion of the social cognitive (dys)functions in autism and their relation to the motivation of individuals with autism to engage in social interaction.

Keywords: Angesicht, ASPERGER-SYNDROME, Autism spectrum disorder, Beeinflussung sozial angemessenen Verhaltens, Blick, Disziplin, EYE GAZE, FALSE BELIEF, Interaction, Interaktion, JOINT ATTENTION, mental states, mental states reasoning, mentale Zustände, MIRROR-NEURON SYSTEM, NORMAL-CHILDREN, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, OF-MIND DEVELOPMENT, OTHERS ACTIONS, Pathologie, PERSPECTIVE-TAKING, Philosophie, pluralist theories, Psychologie, script, Social Cognition, soziale Kognition, SPECTRUM DISORDERS
2010
Huebner, Bryce (2010): Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness. Does anyone care about functional zombies?. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1), S. 133-155. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9126-6

Abstract: It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of 'phenomenal consciousness' are misguided-they fail to capture the interesting connection between commonsense ascriptions of pain and emotion. With this data in hand, I argue that our capacity to distinguish between 'mere things' and 'subjects of moral concern' rests, to a significant extent, on the sorts of mental states that we take a system to have.

Keywords: Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), mental states, mentale Zustände, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, phenomenal consciousness, philosophical zombie, philosophy of mind, qualia, Reflexionen über MTR, Zur Frage: Schreiben wir Assistenzsystemen mentale Zustände zu? Bzw.: durch simulierte Menschlichkeit/soziale Angemessenheit neige wir eher dazu, mentale Zustände zuzuschreiben
2006
Brüne, Martin; Brüne-Cohrs, Ute (2006): Theory of mind--evolution, ontogeny, brain mechanisms and psychopathology. In: Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews 30 (4), S. 437-455. DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.08.001

DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16239031

Abstract: The ability to infer other persons' mental states and emotions has been termed 'theory of mind'. It represents an evolved psychological capacity most highly developed in humans. The evolutionary origins of theory of mind can be traced back in extant non-human primates; theory of mind probably emerged as an adaptive response to increasingly complex primate social interaction. This sophisticated 'metacognitive' ability comes, however, at an evolutionary cost, reflected in a broad spectrum of psychopathological conditions. Extensive research into autistic spectrum disorders has revealed that theory of mind may be selectively impaired, leaving other cognitive faculties intact. Recent studies have shown that observed deficits in theory of mind task performance are part of a broad range of symptoms in schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, some forms of dementia, 'psychopathy' and in other psychiatric disorders. This article reviews the evolutionary psychology of theory of mind including its ontogeny and representation in the central nervous system, and studies of theory of mind in psychopathological conditions.

Keywords: Animals, Biological Evolution, Brain/physiology, Disziplin, Emotions/physiology, Gefühle, Good manners, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Mental Disorders/etiology, Mental Processes, mental states, Native Theorie, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Personal Construct Theory, Postkasten, Psychologie, Psychopathology, Reflexionen über MTR, Social Behavior, Social Mind, theory of mind, (Theory of mind), Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten

2016

2010

2006

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