Alle Publikationen
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2009
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(2009): Others in mind. Social origins of self-consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Online verfügbar unter https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812484
Abstract: Introduction : main ideas -- Self-conscious species -- Six propositions -- Variety of self-reflective mind states -- Mind states in development -- Birth of self-consciousness -- Shame and self-knowledge -- Roots of guilt -- Giving and sharing -- Origins of owning and sharing -- Social construction of identity -- Conclusion : moral space and the self In this book, Philippe Rochat explores self-consciousness, how it originates and how it shapes our lives, arguably the most important and revealing of all psychological problems. Why are we so prone to guilt and embarrassment? Why do we care so much about how others see us, about our reputation? What are the origins of such afflictions? Rochat argues that it is because we are members of a species that evolved the unique propensity to reflect upon themselves as an object of thoughts; an object of thoughts that is potentially evaluated by others. Based on empirical observations, this is a book of ideas, tapping into both developmental and anthropological phenomena and guided by strong existential intuitions regarding the human condition. At the core of these intuitions, there is the idea that human psychic life is predominantly determined by what we imagine others perceive of us
Keywords: Aufmerksamkeit, Entwicklungspsychologie, Erklärung und Genese von Sozialität und Zwischenmenschlichkeit, Herkunft von Sozialität, Philosophie der Psychologie, Psychologie, Selbst, Selbstbewusstsein, Self, Self / Social aspects, Self-consciousness (Sensitivity), Self-knowledge, Theory of, Social aspects 2008
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(2008): Nature and Nurture in the Development of Social Smiling. In: Philosophical Psychology 21 (3), S. 349-357. DOI: 10.1080/09515080802190547
Abstract: Research on the origins of human social smiling is presented as a case study of how a species-specific, species-typical behavior may emerge from thousands of momentary events in which a continuously changing biological organism acts to make, respond to, and learn from its experience.
2003
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(2003): Responsible psychopaths. In: Philosophical Psychology 16 (3), S. 417-429. DOI: 10.1080/0951508032000121797
Abstract: Psychopaths are agents who lack the normal capacity to feel moral emotions (e.g. guilt based on empathy with the victims of their actions). Evidence for attributing psychopathy at least in some cases to genetic or early childhood causes suggests that psychopaths lack free will. However, the paper defends a sense in which psychopaths still may be construed as responsible for their actions, even if their degree of responsibility is less than that of normal agents. Responsibility is understood in Strawsonian terms, as a question of our appropriate reactive attitudes toward an agent for what she does, and as distinct from the question of the agent's own motivating attitudes, which lead him to do what he does. The latter is the question more directly relevant to free will, though moral motivation normally depends on the capacity in early childhood to pick up motivating attitudes from others' reactive attitudes. Reactive attitudes based on hatred rather than anger (e.g. disgust or contempt) count as alternative forms of blame that may be appropriately directed toward agents manifesting bad qualities of will, even as a matter of motivational impairment. So psychopaths may still be said to deserve blame, even if they are incapable of modifying their behavior in response to blame.
Keywords: Beeinflussung sozial angemessenen Verhaltens, Fehlverhalten, Moral emotions, Moral und Kognition, moralische Dimension, Moralphilosophie, Moralpsychologie, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Pathologie, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophie der Psychologie, Psychopathie, Schuld
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