Alle Publikationen
2020
-
(2020): Kant's notion of a transcendental schema. The constitution of objective cognition between epistemology and psychology. Berlin: Peter Lang AG (Studia philosophica et historica)Keywords: Kant, Philosophie, Philosophy, Psychologie, schema, Schemata, Schematheorie, Schematism, Schematismus
2018
-
(2018): Reasoning. The neuroscience of how we think. London, England: Academic Press. Online verfügbar unter http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780128092859
Abstract: Reasoning: The Neuroscience of How We Think is a comprehensive guide to the core topics related to a thorough understanding of reasoning. It presents the current knowledge of the subject in a unified, complete manner, ranging from animal studies, to applied situations, and is the only book available that presents a sustained focus on the neurobiological processes behind reasoning throughout all chapters, while also synthesizing research from animal behavior, cognitive psychology, development, and philosophy for a truly multidisciplinary approach. The book considers historical perspectives, state-of-the-art research methods, and future directions in emerging technology and cognitive enhancement. Written by an expert in the field, this book provides a coherent and structured narrative appropriate for students in need of an introduction to the topic of reasoning as well as researchers seeking well-rounded foundational content. It is essential reading for neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, neuropsychologists and others interested in the neural mechanisms behind thinking, reasoning and higher cognition
-
(2018): The knowledge level in cognitive architectures. Current limitations and possible developments. In: COGNITIVE SYSTEMS RESEARCH 48, S. 39-55. DOI: 10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.05.001
Abstract: In this paper we identify and characterize an analysis of two problematic aspects affecting the representational level of cognitive architectures (CAs), namely: the limited size and the homogeneous typology of the encoded and processed knowledge. We argue that such aspects may constitute not only a technological problem that, in our opinion, should be addressed in order to build artificial agents able to exhibit intelligent behaviors in general scenarios, but also an epistemological one, since they limit the plausibility of the comparison of the CAs' knowledge representation and processing mechanisms with those executed by humans in their everyday activities. In the final part of the paper further directions of research will be explored, trying to address current limitations and future challenges. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Computerwissenschaft, Disziplin, Favoriten, formale Sprache, Formalisierung, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kognitive Architekturen, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), natürliche Sprache, Ontologie, Philosophie, Realtechnik, Sprachverarbeitung, Technik, Technikphilosophie, Überblick, Weltwissen -
(2018): Li Zehou's notion of subjectality as a new conception of the human self. In: Philosophy Compass 13 (5). DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12484
Abstract: Li Zehou stands among the most influential Chinese philosophers in the post-Mao era. His notion of subjectality(zhutixing) is of paramount importance for current developments in contemporary Chinese philosophy. It belongs to the central concepts in Li's theoretical framework, around which his entire philosophical system is constructed. With his elaboration of this concept, Li expanded the problem of the self in post-revolutionary modernism. The present article analyzes the theoretical bases of this concept, exposes its importance in the scope of contemporary Chinese theory and shows why and how it represents a call for a new humanism. Through a multidimensional comparative perspective, the author also explains why the human subject, which is based upon Li's notion of subjectality, has the potential not only to transform (post-)modern alienation into a real human condition, that is, into spiritually fulfilled society of autonomous individuals but also to fill up the prevailing vacuum of values.
2017
-
(2017): Fairness and family background. In: Politics, Philosophy & Economics 16 (2), S. 117-131. DOI: 10.1177/1470594X15618966
Abstract: Fairness preferences fundamentally affect individual behavior and play an important role in shaping social and political institutions. However, people differ both with respect to what they view as fair and with respect to how much weight they attach to fairness considerations. In this article, we study the role of family background in explaining these heterogeneities in fairness preferences. In particular, we examine how socioeconomic background relates to fairness views and to how people make trade-offs between fairness and self-interest. To study this, we conducted an economic experiment with a representative sample of 14- to 15-year-old and matched the experimental data to administrative data on parental income and education. The participants made two distributive choices in the experiment. The first choice was to distribute money between themselves and another participant in a situation where there was no difference in merit. The second choice was to distribute money between two other participants with unequal merits. Our main finding is that there is a systematic difference in fairness view between children from low-socioceconomic status (SES) families and the rest of the participants; more than 50 percent of the participants from low-SES families are egalitarians, whereas only about 20 percent in the rest of the sample hold this fairness view. In contrast, we find no significant difference in the weight attached to fairness between children from different socioeconomic groups.
-
(2017): To be or Not to be Authentic. In Defence of Authenticity as an Ethical Ideal. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3), S. 567-580. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9803-4
Abstract: It has recently been pointed out that the cloudiness of the concept of authenticity as well as inflated ideologies of the 'true self' provide good reasons to criticize theories and ideals of authenticity. Nevertheless, there are also good reasons to defend an ethical ideal of authenticity, not least because of its critical and oppositional force, which is directed against experiences of self-abandonment and self-alienation. I will argue for an elaborated ethical ideal of authenticity: the ambitious ideal of a continuous self-reflective process of 'self-authentication'. For this purpose, the ideal of being authentic in expressing and unfolding one's individual personality and characteristics will be combined with the ideal of being 'an authentic person' - whereby 'a person' is to be understood in a Kantian sense as an autonomous person who is (at least potentially) reasonable and morally responsible.
-
(2017): Social Conceptions of Moral Agency in Hegel and Sellars. In: International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (2), S. 249-265. DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2016.1276950
Abstract: This essay contributes to our understanding of the relation between the philosophies of Hegel and Sellars. While most treatments of this relation have focused on metaphysics or epistemology, I focus on ethics, and in particular on the formulation of moral agency. I argue that Hegel and Sellars arrive at a similar metaphilosophical rejection of individual moral agency in favor of conceptions of moral agency as the outcome of social mediation. To demonstrate this, I trace how Hegel and Sellars offer parallel resolutions of the Kantian paradox': the apparent problem that, in Kantian ethics, moral agents must both freely self-legislate the moral law unto themselves and stand in a dutiful relation to the moral law as a necessary function of practical reason. Drawing Hegel and Sellars together in this way casts new light on Sellars's understudied ethical theory and further evidences the contemporary relevance of Hegel's moral philosophy.
-
(2017): Subjetividad y biopolítica. La pregunta por «la vida». In: Daímon. DOI: 10.6018/daimon/269911
Abstract: With modernity a new definition of the political is established. This article will reflect on the implications of what authors such as Michel Foucault or Hannah Arendt have called "the entrance of life" in the political. From the sharing of these insights, a range of questions will emerge about the possibility of contemporary subjectivity. These questions will be approached by using the contributions of Judith Butler and her theories about precariousness, vulnerability and acknowledgment.
Keywords: acknowledgment, acknowledgment and subjectivity, Anerkennung, biopolitics, Butler, Disziplin, Favoriten, Konstitutionen des Selbst (Anerkennung), life, Modelle/Theorien, Philosophie, (post)strukturalistische Ansätze, postmodern, postmoderne Theorien der Subjektivität, precariousness, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie, subject -
(2017): Type and Metaphor for Computer Programmers. In: Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 21 (1), S. 71-105. DOI: 10.5840/techne20174662
Abstract: The duality of computer programs is characterized, on the one hand, by their physical implementations on physical devices, and, on the other, by the conceptual implementations in programmers’ minds of the objects making up the computational processes they conceive. We contend that central to programmers’ conceptual implementations are (i) the concept of type, at both the programming and the design level, and (ii) metaphors created to facilitate these implementations.
-
(2017): Ethical values and social care robots for older people. An international qualitative study. In: Ethics and Information Technology 19 (1), S. 49-68. DOI: 10.1007/s10676-016-9413-1
Abstract: Values such as respect for autonomy, safety, enablement, independence, privacy and social connectedness should be reflected in the design of social robots. The same values should affect the process by which robots are introduced into the homes of older people to support independent living. These values may, however, be in tension. We explored what potential users thought about these values, and how the tensions between them could be resolved. With the help of partners in the ACCOMPANY project, 21 focus groups (123 participants) were convened in France, the Netherlands and the UK. These groups consisted of: (i) older people, (ii) informal carers and (iii) formal carers of older people. The participants were asked to discuss scenarios in which there is a conflict between older people and others over how a robot should be used, these conflicts reflecting tensions between values. Participants favoured compromise, persuasion and negotiation as a means of reaching agreement. Roles and related role-norms for the robot were thought relevant to resolving tensions, as were hypothetical agreements between users and robot-providers before the robot is introduced into the home. Participants' understanding of each of the values-autonomy, safety, enablement, independence, privacy and social connectedness-is reported. Participants tended to agree that autonomy often has priority over the other values, with the exception in certain cases of safety. The second part of the paper discusses how the values could be incorporated into the design of social robots and operationalised in line with the views expressed by the participants.
-
(2017): Affective recognition and social freedom - the psychoanalytic and normative-reconstructive logics of grounding social critique in Axel Honneth’s work. In: Filozofija i drustvo 28 (3), S. 415-434. DOI: 10.2298/FID1703415E
Abstract: The task of this paper is the following: how should one explain and solve the theory- immanent tension in Honneth's recent works, i.e. the tension that reflects the difference between the concept of social freedom (a concept grounded in Hegel's social philosophy methodologically articulated through normative reconstruction) and the concept of 'affective recognition' (which has replaced the earlier normative concept) - in other words: is there a certain logically-factually grounded path from the question of subjective-individual recognition to the intersubjective recognition of free (legal) subjects in society? My thesis is the following: this supposed tension is a pseudo-tension. It loosens up - without completely resolving itself - as soon as we combine the two logics of grounding critique that we find in Honneth. However, unrelated to my claim about the pseudo-nature of the mentioned tension, the psychoanalytic mode of grounding critique is erroneous, since one cannot directly arrive at collective components of society starting from the empirical constellation of individual consciousnesses. The relation between subjective individuality and objective (intersubjective) generality is an objective contradiction (as opposed to a purely theoretical tension). If we still decide to pursue this path of grounding critique, we we inadvertently introduce a psychologistic approach into social theory. Such an approach can be found in Honneth's theory of intersubjective (normative) recognition as well.
-
(2017): On recognition and self. A discussion based on Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism. In: Asian Philosophy 27 (4), S. 292-308. DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2017.1389388
Abstract: The phenomenon of recognition is a point of contention in the debate between the orthodox Hindus and Buddhists on whether the self (tman) exists. The Hindus, including Naiyyikas and Mm?sakas, argue that recognition evidences the existence of the self, while Buddhist philosopher ntaraksita maintains that there is no self and recognition should be explained in another way. This article examined two disputes, focusing on the two subsidiary aspects of a recognition: memory and self-recognition. For Hindus, it is the existence of the self that makes memory and self-recognition possible. For Buddhists, it is due to the phenomena of memories and self-recognitions that people postulate the existence of the self. I argue that Buddhist explanation of memory is more acceptable, while their debates on self-recognition should be considered as a tie.
-
(2017): Social cognition. From brains to culture. Third edition. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi; Singapore; Washington, DC; Melbourne: Sage
-
(2017): Noumenal Alienation. Rousseau, Kant and Marx on the Dialectics of Self-Determination. In: Kantian Review 22 (04), S. 523-551. DOI: 10.1017/S1369415417000267
Abstract: This article argues that alienation (as Entfremdung) should be understood as a particular form of individual and social heteronomy that can only be overcome by a dialectical combination of individual and collective autonomy, recovering a deontological sense of normative authority. If we think about alienation in Kantian terms, the main source of alienation is a denial of standing or, in the extreme, losing a sense of oneself as a rational normative authority equal to all others. I call the former kind of alienation, where persons deny others equal standing as a normative authority in moral or political terms, first order noumenal alienation, as there is no proper mutual cognition and recognition of each other in such a social context. I call the latter kind of alienation, where a subject does not consider themselves an equal normative authority - or an 'end in oneself' second order noumenal alienation (again, in a moral and a political form). In this sense, alienation violates the dignity of humans as moral and political lawgivers - a dignity seen by Rousseau, Kant and Marx as inalienable: It can be denied or violated, but it cannot be lost.
-
(2017): The future of social cognition. Paradigms, concepts and experiments. In: Synthese 194 (3), S. 655-672. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1162-5
Abstract: Since the publication of Premack and Woodruff's classic paper introducing the notion of a 'theory of mind' (Premack and Woodruff in Behav Brain Sci 1(4):515-526, 1978), interdisciplinary research in social cognition has witnessed the development of theory-theory, simulation theory, hybrid approaches, and most recently interactionist and perceptual accounts of other minds. The challenges that these various approaches present for each other and for research in social cognition range from adequately defining central concepts to designing experimental paradigms for testing empirical hypotheses. But is there any approach that promises to dominate future interdisciplinary research in social cognition? Is social cognition witnessing a gradual paradigm shift where hitherto grounding notions such as theory of mind are no longer viewed as explanatorily necessary? Or have we simply lost our way in attempting to devise adequate experimental setups that could sway the debate in favour of one of the contending accounts? This special issue addresses these questions in an attempt to discover what the future holds for interdisciplinary research in social cognition.
Keywords: adequate social interaction, deutsche Community, Disziplin, Erkenntnistheorie, Kognitive Skills/Social Cognition, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Postkasten, Psychologie, Social Cognition, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, Überblick, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten -
(2017): Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Philosophical Inquiries into Human-Robot Interactions. Cham: Springer International Publishing (Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality). Online verfügbar unter https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gbv/detail.action?docID=4867905
Abstract: This volume offers eleven philosophical investigations into our futurerelations with social robots--robots that are specially designed to engage andconnect with human beings.The contributors present cutting edge research thatexamines whether, and on which terms, robots can become members ofhuman societies. Can our relations to robots be said to be 'social'?Can robots enter into normative relationships with human beings? Howwill human social relations change when we interact with robots atwork and at home?The authors of this volume explore these questions from theperspective of philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, androbotics. The first three chapters offer a taxonomy for the classificationof simulated social interactions, investigate whether human socialinteractions with robots can be genuine, and discuss the significanceof social relations for the formation of human individuality.Subsequent chapters clarify whether robots could be said to actuallyfollow social norms, whether they could live up to the socialmeaning of care in caregiving professions, and how we will need toprogram robots so that they can negotiate the conventions of humansocial space and collaborate with humans. Can we perform jointactions with robots, where both sides need to honour commitments, andhow will such new commitments and practices change our regionalcultures?The authors connect research in social robotics andempirical studies in Human-Robot Interaction to recent debates insocial ontology, social cognition, as well as ethics and philosophy oftechnology.The book is a response to the challenge that social robotics presentsfor our traditional conceptions of social interaction, whichpresuppose such essential capacities as consciousness, intentionality,agency, and normative understanding. The authors develop insightfulanswers along new interdisciplinarypathways in 'robophilosophy,' a new research area that will help us toshape the 'robot revolution,' the distinctive technological change ofthe beginning 21st century. Raul Hakli (PhD) studied philosophy and computer science at theUniversity of Helsinki, Finland. He received his PhD in theoreticalphilosophy in 2010. While editing the book he was Associate Professorat the Aarhus University, Denmark. Currently he works as a researcherat the University of Helsinki, Finland. His research interests includesocial ontology, collective intentionality, epistemology, philosophyof social robotics, and philosophy of the social sciences. Johanna Seibt (PhD. at the Univ of Pittsburg, USA; Dr. phil. habil. atthe Univ of Konstanz, Germany) is Professor for Applied ProcessOntology and Integrative Social Robotics, Aarhus University, Denmark;previously she taught at the Univ of Texas at Austin, USA. Her mainresearch area is in analytical ontology and metaphysics. More recentlyshe works also in philosophy of social robotics. She is head of theResearch Unit for Robophilosophy at the School for Culture and Society, Aarhus University, which conducts interdisciplinaryHumanities research of and in social robotics and coordinates theinternational Research Network for Transdisciplinary Studies in SocialRobotics (TRANSOR).
-
(2017): Kant, Oppression, and the Possibility of Nonculpable Failures to Respect Oneself. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (3), S. 285-305. DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12242
Abstract: I argue that Kant's ethical framework cannot countenance a certain kind of failure to respect oneself that can occur within oppressive social contexts. Kant's assumption that any person, qua rational being, has guaranteed epistemic access to the moral law as the standard of good action and the capacity to act upon this standard makes autonomy an achievement within the individual agent's power, but this is contrary to a feminist understanding of autonomy as a relational achievement that can be thwarted by the systematic attack on autonomy that occurs within oppressive social conditions. Insofar as Kant's negative duty of self-respect is unable to accommodate the ways immersion in oppressive social environments can warp an individual's understanding of what she is owed and capable of as a moral agent, it perpetuates the cruelty of unjust social systems in the guise of respecting individual autonomy. I conclude by considering Carol Hay's argument that those who are oppressed have an obligation to themselves to resist their own oppression, in order to explore how this limitation in how Kant conceives of the duty to respect the self may reach expression in contemporary ethical theory inspired by Kant.
Keywords: agency, Autonomie, Diskriminierung, Disziplin, Ethik, feminism, Feminismus, Gender, Handlungsmacht, Hay, Kant, Macht, Modelle/Theorien, Moral, moral agents, moralische Gesetze, moralisches Wissen, Moralphilosophie, oppressive social systems, Philosophie, Respekt, social systems, ethics, Three main normative ethic perspectives Kant, Utilitarismus virtue ethics, Unterdrückungssysteme -
(2017): Undesirable Consequences and Social Contexts of Technology Use. A Micro-analysis of Embodied User Interaction. In: Interacting with Computers 29 (4), S. 481-493. DOI: 10.1093/iwc/iwx002Keywords: analytics, Computerwissenschaft, Disziplin, empirical studies in collaborative and social computing, fortgeschrittene interaktive Geräte, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, interference of social interaction, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), novel interaction devices, Philosophie, Realtechnik, Reflexionen über MTR, social interaction, Technik, Technik-Nutzer Interaktion, Techniknutzung, Technikphilosophie, technological innovation, Technological innovations, Technologie und Soziales, techno-social framework, undesirable consequences, Volltreffer
-
(2017): Social Technologies. Between Science and Practice. In: Russian Studies in Philosophy 55 (1), S. 1-9. DOI: 10.1080/10611967.2017.1296288
Abstract: Social technologies (or more precisely social-humanitarian technologies) are the active communicative manifestation of a social subject at the level of organizational, administrative, and social planning in the context of the social construction of knowledge and reality. A clear definition of social technologies (ST) must first describe them within the context of the social sciences and humanities: ST are the variety of social practices that are generated by these sciences. These include psychotherapeutic assistance, opinion polls, the practice of language translation, counseling, litigation, and the management of production. The second aspect of ST is that they are characterized by a specific kind of human activity and communication (psychosomatic skills and techniques, language, and psychological and emotional processes), rather than artificial tools, instruments, and devices. The center of ST is occupied by the human subject agent with his knowledge and beliefs, skills and habits, language and traditions.
-
(2017): The Formation of Social Technologies. Stages and Examples. In: Russian Studies in Philosophy 55 (1), S. 10-25. DOI: 10.1080/10611967.2017.1296289
Abstract: The concept of social technology, as used in science and journalism, has yet to reach theoretical maturity. This is related to the general state of the social and human sciences, which have not given rise to sociotechnical sciences, and is also related to a number of sociopolitical circumstances. On the one hand, social technology involves solutions that require an empirical, interdisciplinary synthesis; on the other hand, it represents a series of new theoretical conceptualizations. The article offers a working definition of a number of theoretical positions and typologies, and provides examples of the development and application of social technologies that represent steps toward the construction of a synthetic theory.
-
(2017): Monologic versus Dialogic Distinctions of Selves. In: CONSTRUCTIVIST FOUNDATIONS (13/1), S. 18-21
Abstract: This commentary contrasts the monologic accounts of self-reference pursued in Kauffman's target article with natural language notions of referring to one's self, drawing distinctions, and constructing identities collaboratively. It suggests that mathematical calculi, which assume the perspective of observers, are fundamentally incapable of accounting for how the selves of interactively involved participants in social systems come to be. It questions the claim that a mathematical notion of "self" can shed light on the being of humans and argues for dialogical distinctions of identities. Finally, it suggests that publishing and enacting monological conceptions of selves can have undesirable social consequences.
Keywords: Beobachter, Beobachterperspektive, Disziplin, Identität, Identitätsstiftung, Incalculability of the self, Kauffmann, Konstruktion des Selbst, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Monolog, natürliche Sprache, Philosophie, Selbst, Selbstreferenz, Self Concept, Dialog, social systems, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Konsequenzen, Soziale Systeme, Systemtheorie -
(2017): Automatic actions. Agency, intentionality, and responsibility. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (5), S. 616-644. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1291928
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1291928 Abstract: This article discusses a challenge to the traditional intentional-causalist conceptions of action and intentionality as well as to our everyday and legal conceptions of responsibility, namely the psychological discovery that the greatest part of our alleged actions are performed automatically, that is unconsciously and without a proximal intention causing and sustaining them. The main part of the article scrutinizes several mechanisms of automatic behavior, how they work, and whether the resulting behavior is an action. These mechanisms include actions caused by distal implementation intentions, four types of habit and habitualization, mimicry, and semantically induced automatic behavior (which is later disregarded because of its lack of clarity). According to the intentional-causalist criterion, the automatic behaviors resulting from all but one of these mechanisms turn out to be actions and to be intentional; and even the behavior resulting from the remaining mechanism (natural ly acquired habits) is something we can be responsible for. Hence, the challenge, seen from close up, does not really call the traditional conception of action and intentionality into question. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 1
Keywords: agency, Automatism, Causality, Habits, Habitualization, Intention, Philosophie, Verhaltensforschung -
(2017): Social Transformation and Online Technology. In: Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 21 (1), S. 55-70. DOI: 10.5840/techne20174561
Abstract: The Internet age has seen the influential rise of social media. Consumer culture is tied to this modern phenomenon. This paper begins with an exposition of Herbert Marcuse’s grounding in phenomenology and his subsequent critique of Heidegger’s apolitical Dasein. In explicating Marcuse’s critical theory of technology, this paper will retrace Hegel’s influence on Marcuse in the idea of the dialectic. The dialectic is an integral aspect of social transformation. While modern technology may be value-neutral, it is argued herein that the lack of depth in social media provokes thought and invites critical dissent. Marcuse believes in the capacity of modern tools to effect social reform through adaptation. But emerging pathologies from online technology also have pressing challenges. For instance, social media makes manifest a dominant order that can be manipulative. It can be said that particular interests, notably from business and capitalists, shape the type of consumer culture that online technology promotes. In advancing Marcuse’s relevance in today’s Internet age, the paper will explore how social media as a platform can truly liberate the individual from the ills that consumerism peddles online.
-
(2017): The Turn in Social Investigations of Scientific Knowledge. In: Russian Studies in Philosophy 55 (1), S. 26-36. DOI: 10.1080/10611967.2017.1296290
Abstract: Recognizing the necessary social aspects of scientific knowledge leads to a serious shift in the analysis of science. Whereas until recently the study of scientific knowledge in terms of its social qualities began with its logical structure, today the primary focuses of analysis are the human brain, the material carrier of computer programs, the economic relations in the society of commodity production, and so forth. All of this is not science, but is involved in the production of new knowledge. The boundary between the spiritual and the material, between the scientific and nonscientific is blurred. To study this phenomenon, the vector of research shifts: social qualities are not sought in scientific knowledge, but the external world of non-science exhibits signs of the presence of the spiritual in the form of emerging scientific knowledge
-
(2017): Philosophy of games. In: Philosophy Compass 12 (8). DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12426
Abstract: What is a game? What are we doing when we play a game? What is the value of playing games? Several different philosophical subdisciplines have attempted to answer these questions using very distinctive frameworks. Some have approached games as something like a text, deploying theoretical frameworks from the study of narrative, fiction, and rhetoric to interrogate games for their representational content. Others have approached games as artworks and asked questions about the authorship of games, about the ontology of the work and its performance. Yet others, from the philosophy of sport, have focused on normative issues of fairness, rule application, and competition. The primary purpose of this article is to provide an overview of several different philosophical approaches to games and, hopefully, demonstrate the relevance and value of the different approaches to each other. Early academic attempts to cope with games tried to treat games as a subtype of narrative and to interpret games exactly as one might interpret a static, linear narrative. A faction of game studies, self-described as ludologists, argued that games were a substantially novel form and could not be treated with traditional tools for narrative analysis. In traditional narrative, an audience is told and interprets the story, where in a game, the player enacts and creates the story. Since that early debate, theorists have attempted to offer more nuanced accounts of how games might achieve similar ends to more traditional texts. For example, games might be seen as a novel type of fiction, which uses interactive techniques to achieve immersion in a fictional world. Alternately, games might be seen as a new way to represent causal systems, and so a new way to criticize social and political entities. Work from contemporary analytic philosophy of art has, on the other hand, asked questions whether games could be artworks and, if so, what kind. Much of this debate has concerned the precise nature of the artwork, and the relationship between the artist and the audience. Some have claimed that the audience is a cocreator of the artwork, and so games are a uniquely unfinished and cooperative art form. Others have claimed that, instead, the audience does not help create the artwork; rather, interacting with the artwork is how an audience member appreciates the artist's finished production. Other streams of work have focused less on the game as a text or work, and more on game play as a kind of activity. One common view is that game play occurs in a magic circle. Inside the magic circle, players take on new roles, follow different rules, and actions have different meanings. Actions inside the magic circle do not have their usual consequences for the rest of life. Enemies of the magic circle view have claimed that the view ignores the deep integration of game life from ordinary life and point to gambling, gold farming, and the status effects of sports. Philosophers of sport, on the other hand, have approached games with an entirely different framework. This has lead into investigations about the normative nature of gameswhat guides the applications of rules and how those rules might be applied, interpreted, or even changed. Furthermore, they have investigated games as social practices and as forms of life.