Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Reasoning about Imprecise Beliefs in Multi-Agent Systems with PDT Logic. In: KI - Künstliche Intelligenz 31 (1), S. 63-71. DOI: 10.1007/s13218-016-0455-7Keywords: abductive reasoning, Abduktion, abduktives Schließen, Agenten, Agenten-Überzeugung, Angemessenheit von Überzeugungen, Bedeutung, Belief updates, deutsche Community, Epistemische Logik/Modallogik/Doxastische Logik/Wissenslogik, Formalisierung, frame semantics, imprecise beliefs, Imprecise probabilities, Intellektualtechnik, Knowledge representation, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), model, Modell, Modellierung, multi-agent systems, Multi-Agenten-Systeme, PDT Logic, Probabilistic Doxastic Temporal Logic, Realtechnik, Technik, Ungenaue Überzeugungen, Wahrscheinlichkeit
2016
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(2016): Epistemic logics for sceptical agents. In: JOURNAL OF LOGIC AND COMPUTATION 26 (6), S. 1815-1841
Abstract: In this article, we introduce an epistemic modal operator modelling knowledge over distributive non-associative full Lambek calculus with a negation. Our approach is based on the relational semantics for substructural logics: we interpret the elements of a relational frame as information states consisting of collections of data. The principal epistemic relation between the states is the one of being a reliable source of information, on the basis of which we explicate the notion of knowledge as information confirmed by a reliable source. From this point of view it is natural to define the epistemic operator formally as the backward-looking diamond modality. The framework is a generalization and extension of the system of relevant epistemic logic proposed by Majer and Peliš (2009, college Publications, 123–135) and developed by Bílková et al. (2010, college Publications, 22–38). The system is modular in the sense that the axiomatization of the epistemic operator is sound and complete with respect to a wide class of background logics, which makes the system potentially applicable to a wide class of epistemic contexts. Our system admits a weak form of logical omniscience (the monotonicity rule), but avoids stronger ones (a necessitation rule and a K-axiom) as well as some closure properties discussed in normal epistemic logics (like positive and negative introspection). For these properties we provide characteristic frame conditions, so that they can be present in the system if they are considered to be appropriate for some specific epistemic context. We also prove decidability of the weakest epistemic logic we consider, using a filtration method. Finally, we outline further extensions of our framework to a multiagent system
Keywords: Agenten, Agenten-Überzeugung, Disziplin, epistemic modal operator, Epistemische Logik/Modallogik/Doxastische Logik/Wissenslogik, Epistemische Operatoren, frame semantics, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), mögliche Welten, mögliche Welten Theorie, multi-agent systems, Multi-Agenten-Systeme, Philosophie, possible worlds theory, Realtechnik, relational frame, Sprache, Sprachtheorie, Sprachverstehen, Technik 2014
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(2014): Believing on trust. In: Synthese 191 (9), S. 2009-2028. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0376-z
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concerned Hardwig (J Philos 82:335-49, 1985; J Philos 88:693-708, 1991) in his early papers, papers that are often referenced in recent debates in social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it sometimes not so clear what Hardwig's claims are, I offer some remarks of interpretation that might be of interest. The main purpose of the paper, however, is this: following various cues in Hardwig's writing, I specify certain epistemic properties of agents in social systems, such that, roughly speaking, for agents to know (or be justified in believing) what the 'system knows', social relations of epistemic trust between agents in the system are necessary. I will suggest that we can view this social form of epistemic trust as non-inferential dispositions to believe what some individual or other source of information asserts or transmits. When this disposition is discriminating and defeater-sensitive, it can ground knowledge and justification. Or, more cautiously, we should be sympathetic to this view if we are inclined to accept the core insight of process reliabilism. Finally, I will offer some remarks about how epistemic trust and epistemic reasons may relate on this picture.
Keywords: Agenten-Überzeugung, Annahmen, Disziplin, Epistemische Logik/Modallogik/Doxastische Logik/Wissenslogik, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Philosophie, Realtechnik, social systems, Sozialverstehen, Technik, Trust, Überzeugung, Vertrauen 2012
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(2012): Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions. In: Social Epistemology 26 (2), S. 163-173. DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211
Abstract: In Epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker makes a tremendous contribution to theorizing the intersection of social epistemology with theories of justice. Theories of justice often take as their object of assessment either interpersonal transactions (specific exchanges between persons) or particular institutions. They may also take a more comprehensive perspective in assessing systems of institutions. This systemic perspective may enable control of the cumulative effects of millions of individual transactions that cannot be controlled at the individual or institutional levels. This is true not only with respect to the overall distribution of such goods as income and wealth, but also with respect to the goods of testimonial and hermeneutical justice. Cognitive biases that may be difficult for even epistemically virtuous individuals to correct on their own may be more susceptible to correction if we focus on the principles that should govern our systems of testimonial gathering and assessment. Hence, while Fricker's focus on individual epistemic virtue is important, we also need to consider what epistemic justice as a virtue of social systems would require. My paper will indicate some directions forward on this front, focusing on the need for integration of diverse institutions and persons engaged in inquiry.
2007
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(2007): Social Systems. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (5), S. 557-578. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701545981
Abstract: It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building on the view that folk psychological knowledge is knowledge of theoretical models, I argue that social knowledge is best understood as lying on a continuum between behavioral and full-blown psychological models. Between the two extremes, we have what I call social models. Social models represent social structures in terms of their overall purpose and circumscribe individuals' roles within them. These models help us predict what others will do or plan what we should do without providing information about what agents think or want. Thinking about social knowledge this way gives us a more nuanced picture of what capacities are engaged in social planning and interaction, and gives us a better tool with which to think about the social knowledge of animals and young children.
Keywords: Agenten-Überzeugung, BELIEFS, Beliefs in beliefs, Disziplin, Entwicklungspsychologie, Erwartungen, Erwartungserwartung, folk psychology, INFANTS, Intellektualtechnik, INTENTIONS, Interaktion, KNOWLEDGE, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), MIND, Modelle/Theorien, ORIGINS, OTHERS, PERCEPTION, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Psychologie, REPRESENTATION, social knowledge, RHESUS-MONKEYS, social systems, ethics, soziale Kognition, Sozialverhalten, Sozialverstehen, Technik, theoretical models, theory of mind, Überzeugung 1999
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(1999) : The Belief-Desire-Intention Model of Agency In: Goos, Gerhard; Hartmanis, Juris; van Leeuwen, Jan; Müller, Jörg P.; Rao, Anand S.; Singh, Munindar P. (Hg.): Intelligents agents V: Agent theories, architectures, and languages : 5th International Workshop, ATAL'98 : Paris, France, July 1998 : proceedings, 1555: New York: Springer (Lecture notes in computer science Lecture notes in artificial intelligence), S. 1-10
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49057-4_1 Abstract: Within the ATAL community, the belief-desire-intention (BDI) model has come to be possibly the best known and best studied model of practical reasoning agents. There are several reasons for its success, but perhaps the most compelling are that the BDI model combines a respectable philosophical model of human practical reasoning, (originally developed by Michael Bratman [1]), a number of implementations (in the IRMA architecture [2] and the various PRS-like systems currently available [7]), several successful applications (including the now-famous fault diagnosis system for the space shuttle, as well as factory process control systems and business process management [8]), and finally, an elegant abstract logical semantics, which have been taken up and elaborated upon widely within the agent research community [14, 16].
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Goos, Gerhard; Hartmanis, Juris; van Leeuwen, Jan; Müller, Jörg P.; Rao, Anand S.; Singh, Munindar P. (Hg.) (1999): Intelligents agents V. Agent theories, architectures, and languages : 5th International Workshop, ATAL'98 : Paris, France, July 1998 : proceedings. Atal'98. New York: Springer (Lecture notes in computer science Lecture notes in artificial intelligence)
1995
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(1995): BDI Agents: From Theory to Practice. AAAI. In: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Multiagent SystemsKeywords: Agenten, Agenten-Überzeugung, agents, Architekturen, BDI, belief, belief-desire, desire, Überzeugung, Überzeugungen
1991
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(1991): Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. In: The Philosophical Review 100 (2). DOI: 10.2307/2185304
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2185304 Abstract: What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends.
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