Alle Publikationen
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2016
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(2016): How Does It Work?. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2), S. 182-210. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103262550
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393103262550 Abstract: This article addresses the following problems: What is a mechanism, how canit be discovered, and what is the role of the knowledge of mechanisms in scientific explanation and technological control? The proposed answers are these. A mechanism is one of the processes in a concrete system that makes it what it is— for example, metabolism in cells, interneuronal connections in brains, work in factories and offices, research in laboratories, and litigation in courts of law. Because mechanisms are largely or totally imperceptible, they must be conjectured. Once hypothesized they help explain, because a deep scientific explanation is an answer to a question of the form, “How does it work, that is, what makes it tick—what are its mechanisms?” Thus, by contrast with the subsumption of particulars under a generalization, an explanation proper consists in unveiling some lawful mechanism, as when political stability is explainedby either coercion, public opinion manipulation, or democratic participation. Finding mechanisms satisfies not only the yearning for understanding, but also the need for control.
Keywords: explanation, function, mechanism, philosophy of the social sciences, process, system, systemism -
(2016): “We Always Have a Beer after the Meeting”. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (3), S. 251-275. DOI: 10.1177/0048393106289791
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(2016): Pragmatism, Ontology, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Practice. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (1), S. 3-27. DOI: 10.1177/0048393116654869
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(2016): Theorizing the Mechanisms of Conceptual and Semiotic Space. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2), S. 283-299. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103262554
Abstract: In this piece the author takes issue with Mario Bunge's claims that conceptual and semiotic systems have "compositions, environments and structures, but no mechanisms." Structures, according to Bunge, can never be mechanisms in conceptual and semiotic systems. Contra this the author argues that in social systems, social structures (which are concept-dependent and reproduced and/or transformed, at least in part, semiotically), can be mechanisms in the sense that such structures are one of the processes in a concrete system that makes it what it is. As such, not only may conceptual and semiotic systems have mechanisms, but they may also themselves be considered some of the mechanisms that make the social what it is. As such, they can be said to possess powers and liabilities that neither reside at lower levels nor are explainable in terms of the lower level. To hold out the prospect of social explanation by conceptual and/or semiotic mechanisms does not represent an attempt to decouple these systems from material factors. What it does mean is that conceptual and/or semiotic systems can, potentially at least, play a role in social explanation; and themselves be subject to explanation.
Keywords: Bunge, cause, conceptualism, Disziplin, emergence, Emergenz, Erklärung, Erklärung des Sozialen, explanation, Interaktion, Konzept, mechanisms, Ontologie, Philosophie, realism, Realismus, reductionism, Reduktionismus, semiotics, Semiotik, social, social realism, Sozialverhalten, structures, Strukturalismus, Strukturen, Systemtheorie, Theoriebegriffe, Überblick 2009
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(2009): The We-Mode Approach. A Response to John Wettersten’s Review of The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (3), S. 513-517. DOI: 10.1177/0048393109352830
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393109352830 Abstract: The paper is a response to some critical points and omissions in John Wettersten’s review of my recent book The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View (Oxford University Press, 2007). I point out in this short paper that the reviewer has not discussed the most central notions in the book relating to its “we-mode” approach, i.e. collective acceptance, group reasons, the collectivity condition, collective commitment and their role in accounting for e.g. cooperation, social institutions, cultural evolution. I also clarify the ontological commitments of my broadly naturalistic approach and show e.g. that we-mode social groups do exist as social systems but not a full-blown collective agents, although it is conceptually and instrumentally central to view them as collective agents. Also questions of we-mode versus I-mode explanations of collective action are considered in the paper.
Keywords: explanation, Gruppennorm, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, philosophy of the social sciences, social action, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Socially extended mind, Soziale Motivation kollektiven Handelns, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim), we-mode, We-Mode Approach 2008
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(2008): The Three Logics of Selection theory of Action as Theory of Defining the Situation. In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie (37.5), S. 362-379
Abstract: Using Hartmut Esser's model of frame selection as a point of reference, this paper examines how different ways of defining a situation influence the selection of action. The introduction of the model of frame selection has substantially changed the theory of action within the macro-micro-macro-model of sociological explanation. The theory of action has become closely related to the sociology of knowledge: the theory of action as the theory of defining the situation. This paper contributes to this theoretical approach. It is argued that the criteria for selecting between the interpretive patterns which orient and guide actions depend on three different forms of defining the situation: (1) defining the situation constatively, i.e. identifying the characteristics of a given situation; anti two forms of defining the situation performatively: (2) constituting the situation by referring to a definition of the situation which is effectively enforceable or (3) constituting the situation by referring to a definition of the situation which is commonly shared. The assumption that the different ways of selecting between interpretive patterns depend on these three forms of defining the situation contradicts the view of the current model of frame selection, which in this respect refers to the difference between an automatic-spontaneous and a reflective-calculating mode of selection.
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