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2016
Fiebich, Anika (2016): Pluralism, social cognition, and interaction in autism. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2), S. 161-184. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1261394

Abstract: In this paper, I investigate social cognition and its relation to interaction in autism from the perspective of a pluralist account of social understanding by considering behavioral as well as neuroscientific findings. Traditionally, researchers have focused on mental state reasoning in autism, which is uncontroversially impaired. A pluralist account of social cognition aims to explore the varieties of social understanding that are acquired throughout ontogeny and may play a role in everyday life. The analysis shows that children with autism are well able to understand other people's behavior by considering social rules and norms, scripts, and stereotypes. Moreover, some individuals with autism succeed in understanding other people's behavior in terms of mental states by employing explicit behavioral rules as a compensatory strategy. The paper ends with a discussion of the social cognitive (dys)functions in autism and their relation to the motivation of individuals with autism to engage in social interaction.

Keywords: Angesicht, ASPERGER-SYNDROME, Autism spectrum disorder, Beeinflussung sozial angemessenen Verhaltens, Blick, Disziplin, EYE GAZE, FALSE BELIEF, Interaction, Interaktion, JOINT ATTENTION, mental states, mental states reasoning, mentale Zustände, MIRROR-NEURON SYSTEM, NORMAL-CHILDREN, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, OF-MIND DEVELOPMENT, OTHERS ACTIONS, Pathologie, PERSPECTIVE-TAKING, Philosophie, pluralist theories, Psychologie, script, Social Cognition, soziale Kognition, SPECTRUM DISORDERS
2009
Kennett, Jeanette; Fine, Cordelia (2009): Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1), S. 77-96. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-008-9136-4

Abstract: The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814-834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt's research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no 'real' moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions. We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.

Keywords: ASPERGER-SYNDROME, ATTITUDES, Automatic processing, AUTOMATICITY, BEHAVIOR, Empathy, Ethik, IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST, INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES, Meta-ethics, Moral, Moral agency, Moral intuitions, Moral judgment, Moralphilosophie, Motivation, PREJUDICE, Psychologie, Reason-responding, Reason-tracking, STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION

2016

2009

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