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  • 2017

  • McHugh, Cillian; McGann, Marek; Igou, Eric R.; Kinsella, Elaine L. (2017): Searching for Moral Dumbfounding. Identifying Measurable Indicators of Moral Dumbfounding. In: Collabra: Psychology 3 (1). DOI: 10.1525/collabra.79

    Abstract: Moral dumbfounding is defined as maintaining a moral judgement, without supporting reasons. The most cited demonstration of dumbfounding does not identify a specific measure of dumbfounding and has not been published in peer-review form, or directly replicated. Despite limited empirical examination, dumbfounding has been widely discussed in moral psychology. The present research examines the reliability with which dumbfounding can be elicited, and aims to identify measureable indicators of dumbfounding. Study 1 aimed at establishing the effect that is reported in the literature. Participants read four scenarios and judged the actions described. An Interviewer challenged participants’ stated reasons for judgements. Dumbfounding was evoked, as measured by two indicators, admissions of not having reasons (17%), unsupported declarations (9%) with differences between scenarios. Study 2 measured dumbfounding as the selecting of an unsupported declaration as part of a computerised task. We observed high rates of dumbfounding across all scenarios. Studies 3a (college sample) and 3b (MTurk sample), addressing limitations in Study 2, replaced the unsupported declaration with an admission of having no reason, and included open-ended responses that were coded for unsupported declarations. As predicted, lower rates of dumbfounding were observed (3a 20%; 3b 16%; or 3a 32%; 3b 24% including unsupported declarations in open-ended responses). Two measures provided evidence for dumbfounding across three studies; rates varied with task type (interview/computer task), and with the particular measure being employed (admissions of not having reasons/unsupported declarations). Possible cognitive processes underlying dumbfounding and limitations of methodologies used are discussed as a means to account for this variability.

  • 2016

  • 2016Misztal, Barbara A. (2016): Normality and Trust in Goffman's Theory of Interaction Order. In: Sociological Theory 19 (3), S. 312-324. DOI: 10.1111/0735-2751.00143

    Abstract: The article asserts that Goffman's concept of normality comes close to the notion of trust as a protective mechanism that prevents chaos and disorder by providing us with feelings of safety, certainty, and familiarity. Arguing that to account for the tendency of social order to be seen as normal we need to conceptualize trust as the routine background of everyday interaction, the article analyzes Goffmans concepts of normal appearances, stigma, and frames as devices for endowing social order with predictability, reliability, and legibility. For Goffman, normality is a collective achievement, which is possible because of the orderliness of interactional activities, which is-in turn-predicated "on a large base of shared cognitive presuppositions, if not normative ones, and self-sustained restraints".

  • Rukgaber, Matthew S. (2016): Philosophical Anthropology, Shame, and Disability. In Favor of an Interpersonal Theory of Shame. In: Res Philosophica 93 (4), S. 743-765. DOI: 10.11612/resphil.1472

    Abstract: This article argues against a leading cognitivist and moral interpretation of shame that is present in the philosophical literature. That standard view holds that shame is the felt-response to a loss of self-esteem, which is the result of negative self-assessment. I hold that shame is a heteronomous and primitive bodily affect that is perceptual rather than judgmental in nature. Shame results from the breakdown and thwarting of our desire for anonymous, unexceptional, and disattentive co-existence with others. I use the sociological theory of Erving Goffman and the theory of shame found in philosophical anthropology to support this view. I also use the cases of shame and chronic shame that often accompany disability to show that shame is separable from negative self-assessment and, instead, emerges as an affective response to a world (of equipment, things, and people) that disallows unburdened and unreflective interpersonal equilibrium.

  • 2012

  • Matsuda, Yoshi-Taka; Okamoto, Yoko; Ida, Misako; Okanoya, Kazuo; Myowa-Yamakoshi, Masako (2012): Infants prefer the faces of strangers or mothers to morphed faces. An uncanny valley between social novelty and familiarity. In: Biology letters 8 (5), S. 725-728. DOI: 10.1098/rsbl.2012.0346

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22696289 

    Abstract: The 'uncanny valley' response is a phenomenon involving the elicitation of a negative feeling and subsequent avoidant behaviour in human adults and infants as a result of viewing very realistic human-like robots or computer avatars. It is hypothesized that this uncanny feeling occurs because the realistic synthetic characters elicit the concept of 'human' but fail to satisfy it. Such violations of our normal expectations regarding social signals generate a feeling of unease. This conflict-induced uncanny valley between mutually exclusive categories (human and synthetic agent) raises a new question: could an uncanny feeling be elicited by other mutually exclusive categories, such as familiarity and novelty? Given that infants prefer both familiarity and novelty in social objects, we address this question as well as the associated developmental profile. Using the morphing technique and a preferential-looking paradigm, we demonstrated uncanny valley responses of infants to faces of mothers (i.e. familiarity) and strangers (i.e. novelty). Furthermore, this effect strengthened with the infant's age. We excluded the possibility that infants detect and avoid traces of morphing. This conclusion follows from our finding that the infants equally preferred strangers' faces and the morphed faces of two strangers. These results indicate that an uncanny valley between familiarity and novelty may accentuate the categorical perception of familiar and novel objects.

  • 1994

  • Hellmann, Kai-Uwe (1994): Zur Eigendynamik sozialer Probleme. In: Soziale Probleme 5 (1/2), S. 144-167
  • 1984

  • Triplet, Rodney G.; Cohn, Ellen S. (1984): SOCIAL LEARNING VERSUS ATTRIBUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS. THE EFFECT OF TASK FAMILIARITY ON TASK PERFORMANCE PERCEPTIONS AND FUTURE SUCCESS EXPECTANCIES. In: Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 12 (1), S. 75-83. DOI: 10.2224/sbp.1984.12.1.75

    Abstract: Social learning theory (Rotter, 1954, 1966. 1975) predicts that generalized locus of control influences how expectancies for future success result from success or failure at performing a task. However, a study by Weiner et al. (1976) has cast serious doubt on the social learning model of expectancy formation by supporting the attributional (Heider, 1958; Weiner et al., 1971) interpretation of the same phenomena as a function of the stability of causal attributions. Unfortunately, Weiner et al's (1976) findings are suspect due to several problems with their methodology. The present study was designed to correct for these problems. Partial support was found for elements of both the social learning and attributional theories. Specifically, social learning theory best accounted for the effects of task familiarity on changes in expectancies, while attributional theory provided the best description of the types of information that are involved in the initial formation of expectancies.

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