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  • 2017

  • Dolezal, Luna (2017): The phenomenology of self-presentation. Describing the structures of intercorporeality with Erving Goffman. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2), S. 237-254. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-015-9447-6

    Abstract: Self-presentation is a term that indicates conscious and unconscious strategies for controlling or managing how one is perceived by others in terms of both appearance and comportment. In this article, I will discuss the phenomenology of self-presentation with respect to the phenomenological insights of Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty regarding the visibility of the body within intercorporeal relations through 'behaviour' and 'expression.' In doing so, I will turn to the work of the Canadian sociologist and social theorist Erving Goffman. Goffman's account of self-presentation suggests why embodied subjects adopt certain styles of ordered bodily behaviour as determined by the broader social order, giving existential and social significance to the ontological structures of intercorporeal bodily communication. Following Goffman, I will suggest that the embodied subject is continuously-and constitutionally-engaged in implicit and explicit strategies to manage how the body is presented to others. In articulating self-presentation as a feature of intercorporeality, my aim in this article is to use Goffman's insights to extend Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's accounts of bodily communication by demonstrating that bodily communication that is instantiated at the level of intercorporeality is always expressed through social life with its various historical, cultural and linguistic dimensions.

    Keywords: Embodiment, Goffman, Husserl, Intercorporeality, Intersubjectivity, Konstruktion des Selbst, Merleau-Ponty, Nonverbal communication, Nonverbale Kommunikation, Öffentliche Darstellung, Rollen, Self-presentation, Soziale Rolle

  • 2009

  • Slatman, Jenny (2009): A strange hand. On self-recognition and recognition of another. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3), S. 321-342. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9127-5

    Abstract: This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition, however, Husserl's account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed that self-recognition involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty's later work, describing self-recognition as the result of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one's "hereness" and "thereness". The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another.

    Keywords: Anderkennung des Anderen, Anerkennung, Anerkennung des Selbst und des Anderen (Phänomenologie), Disziplin, Erkenntnistheorie, Favoriten, Husserl, IDENTIFICATION, Konstitutionen des Selbst (Anerkennung), Merleau-Ponty, Mirror image, Modelle/Theorien, Ontologie, Phänomenologie, Philosophie, RECOGNITION, Recognition of another, Rubber hand illusion, Selbst, Selbst-Anerkennung, Self-recognition, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie
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