Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Implicit moral evaluations. A multinomial modeling approach. In: Cognition 158, S. 224-241. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.013
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27865113 Abstract: Implicit moral evaluations-i.e., immediate, unintentional assessments of the wrongness of actions or persons-play a central role in supporting moral behavior in everyday life. Yet little research has employed methods that rigorously measure individual differences in implicit moral evaluations. In five experiments, we develop a new sequential priming measure-the Moral Categorization Task-and a multinomial model that decomposes judgment on this task into multiple component processes. These include implicit moral evaluations of moral transgression primes (Unintentional Judgment), accurate moral judgments about target actions (Intentional Judgment), and a directional tendency to judge actions as morally wrong (Response Bias). Speeded response deadlines reduced Intentional Judgment but not Unintentional Judgment (Experiment 1). Unintentional Judgment was stronger toward moral transgression primes than non-moral negative primes (Experiments 2-4). Intentional Judgment was associated with increased error-related negativity, a neurophysiological indicator of behavioral control (Experiment 4). Finally, people who voted for an anti-gay marriage amendment had stronger Unintentional Judgment toward gay marriage primes (Experiment 5). Across Experiments 1-4, implicit moral evaluations converged with moral personality: Unintentional Judgment about wrong primes, but not negative primes, was negatively associated with psychopathic tendencies and positively associated with moral identity and guilt proneness. Theoretical and practical applications of formal modeling for moral psychology are discussed.
Keywords: Adult, Cerebral Cortex/physiology, Cognition/physiology, Electroencephalography, Evoked Potentials, Female, Guilt, Humans, Individuality, Intention, Judgment/physiology, Kognitionswissenschaften, Male, Middle Aged, Models, Psychological, Moral, Morals, Neuropsychological Tests, Personality, Personality Assessment, science direct, Shame, Social Perception -
(2017): Parent-child learning interactions. A review of the literature on scaffolding. In: The British journal of educational psychology 87 (2), S. 241-254. DOI: 10.1111/bjep.12147
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28220477 Abstract: BACKGROUND Scaffolding can be observed during learning-based interactions, when interventions by parents are adjusted according to children's observed abilities, with the main goal of enabling the child to work independently (Wood et al., 1976, Journal of child psychology and psychiatry, 17, 89). Such contingent instruction behaviours occur from infancy, and are said to be relevant for children's development of executive function, language acquisition, and cognitive and academic abilities. Scaffolding behaviours are considered a product of the family and the wider context, a process affected by parent and child characteristics, and the environment they inhabit. Over 40 years of scaffolding research has produced an abundance of findings. Early investigations were concerned with the conceptualization of scaffolding, whereas more recent studies build upon the theory, testing its correlates and relevance for child development. AIMS This article offers an overview of the literature, focusing on the relevance of scaffolding for child developmental outcomes, and the factors associated with individual differences in the process. STRUCTURE The article is structured such that the origins of the theory and its definitions are discussed first, followed by an overview of the correlates of scaffolding. The review concludes with a critical evaluation of the literature, proposing novel avenues for future research.
2016
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(2016): Young Children See a Single Action and Infer a Social Norm. In: Psychological science 27 (10), S. 1360-1370. DOI: 10.1177/0956797616661182
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27634004 Abstract: Human social life depends heavily on social norms that prescribe and proscribe specific actions. Typically, young children learn social norms from adult instruction. In the work reported here, we showed that this is not the whole story: Three-year-old children are promiscuous normativists. In other words, they spontaneously inferred the presence of social norms even when an adult had done nothing to indicate such a norm in either language or behavior. And children of this age even went so far as to enforce these self-inferred norms when third parties "broke" them. These results suggest that children do not just passively acquire social norms from adult behavior and instruction; rather, they have a natural and proactive tendency to go from "is" to "ought." That is, children go from observed actions to prescribed actions and do not perceive them simply as guidelines for their own behavior but rather as objective normative rules applying to everyone equally.
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(2016): Power in everyday life. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 113 (36), S. 10043-10048. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1604820113
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27551069 Abstract: How does power manifest itself in everyday life? Using experience-sampling methodology, we investigated the prevalence, sources, and correlates of power in people's natural environments. Participants experienced power-relevant situations regularly, though not frequently. High power was not restricted to a limited few: almost half of the sample reported experiencing high-power positions. Positional power and subjective feelings of power were strongly related but had unique relations with several individual difference measures and independent effects on participants' affect, cognition, and interpersonal relations. Subjective feelings of power resulted more from within-participant situational fluctuation, such as the social roles participants held at different times, than from stable differences between people. Our data supported some theoretical predictions about power's effects on affect, cognition, and interpersonal relations, but qualified others, particularly highlighting the role of responsibility in power's effects. Although the power literature has focused on high power, we found stronger effects of low power than high power.
2014
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(2014): Unwritten rules. Virtual bargaining underpins social interaction, culture, and society. In: Trends in cognitive sciences 18 (10), S. 512-519. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.05.010
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25073460 Abstract: Many social interactions require humans to coordinate their behavior across a range of scales. However, aspects of intentional coordination remain puzzling from within several approaches in cognitive science. Sketching a new perspective, we propose that the complex behavioral patterns - or 'unwritten rules' - governing such coordination emerge from an ongoing process of 'virtual bargaining'. Social participants behave on the basis of what they would agree to do if they were explicitly to bargain, provided the agreement that would arise from such discussion is commonly known. Although intuitively simple, this interpretation has implications for understanding a broad spectrum of social, economic, and cultural phenomena (including joint action, team reasoning, communication, and language) that, we argue, depend fundamentally on the virtual bargains themselves. zitiert von 27
2012
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(2012): Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition. ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy. In: Brain structure & function 217 (4), S. 783-796. DOI: 10.1007/s00429-012-0380-y
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22270812 Abstract: Morally judicious behavior forms the fabric of human sociality. Here, we sought to investigate neural activity associated with different facets of moral thought. Previous research suggests that the cognitive and emotional sources of moral decisions might be closely related to theory of mind, an abstract-cognitive skill, and empathy, a rapid-emotional skill. That is, moral decisions are thought to crucially refer to other persons' representation of intentions and behavioral outcomes as well as (vicariously experienced) emotional states. We thus hypothesized that moral decisions might be implemented in brain areas engaged in 'theory of mind' and empathy. This assumption was tested by conducting a large-scale activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies, which assessed 2,607 peak coordinates from 247 experiments in 1,790 participants. The brain areas that were consistently involved in moral decisions showed more convergence with the ALE analysis targeting theory of mind versus empathy. More specifically, the neurotopographical overlap between morality and empathy disfavors a role of affective sharing during moral decisions. Ultimately, our results provide evidence that the neural network underlying moral decisions is probably domain-global and might be dissociable into cognitive and affective sub-systems.
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(2012): When humanoid robots become human-like interaction partners: corepresentation of robotic actions. In: Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and performance 38 (5), S. 1073-1077. DOI: 10.1037/a0029493
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22866762 Abstract: In human-human interactions, corepresenting a partner's actions is crucial to successfully adjust and coordinate actions with others. Current research suggests that action corepresentation is restricted to interactions between human agents facilitating social interaction with conspecifics. In this study, we investigated whether action corepresentation, as measured by the social Simon effect (SSE), is present when we share a task with a real humanoid robot. Further, we tested whether the believed humanness of the robot's functional principle modulates the extent to which robotic actions are corepresented. We described the robot to participants either as functioning in a biologically inspired human-like way or in a purely deterministic machine-like manner. The SSE was present in the human-like but not in the machine-like robot condition. These findings suggest that humans corepresent the actions of nonbiological robotic agents when they start to attribute human-like cognitive processes to the robot. Our findings provide novel evidence for top-down modulation effects on action corepresentation in human-robot interaction situations.
2010
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(2010): Social cognition and the evolution of language: constructing cognitive phylogenies. In: Neuron 65 (6), S. 795-814. DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.011
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.011 Abstract: Human language and social cognition are closely linked: advanced social cognition is necessary for children to acquire language, and language allows forms of social understanding (and, more broadly, culture) that would otherwise be impossible. Both "language" and "social cognition" are complex constructs, involving many independent cognitive mechanisms, and the comparative approach provides a powerful route to understanding the evolution of such mechanisms. We provide a broad comparative review of mechanisms underlying social intelligence in vertebrates, with the goal of determining which human mechanisms are broadly shared, which have evolved in parallel in other clades, and which, potentially, are uniquely developed in our species. We emphasize the importance of convergent evolution for testing hypotheses about neural mechanisms and their evolution.
2008
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(2008): Implicit and explicit processes in social cognition. In: Neuron 60 (3), S. 503-510. DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2008.10.032
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18995826 Abstract: In this review we consider research on social cognition in which implicit processes can be compared and contrasted with explicit, conscious processes. In each case, their function is distinct, sometimes complementary and sometimes oppositional. We argue that implicit processes in social interaction are automatic and are often opposed to conscious strategies. While we are aware of explicit processes in social interaction, we cannot always use them to override implicit processes. Many studies show that implicit processes facilitate the sharing of knowledge, feelings, and actions, and hence, perhaps surprisingly, serve altruism rather than selfishness. On the other hand, higher-level conscious processes are as likely to be selfish as prosocial.
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(2008): Culture-sensitive neural substrates of human cognition. A transcultural neuroimaging approach. In: Nature reviews. Neuroscience 9 (8), S. 646-654. DOI: 10.1038/nrn2456
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18641669 Abstract: Our brains and minds are shaped by our experiences, which mainly occur in the context of the culture in which we develop and live. Although psychologists have provided abundant evidence for diversity of human cognition and behaviour across cultures, the question of whether the neural correlates of human cognition are also culture-dependent is often not considered by neuroscientists. However, recent transcultural neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that one's cultural background can influence the neural activity that underlies both high- and low-level cognitive functions. The findings provide a novel approach by which to distinguish culture-sensitive from culture-invariant neural mechanisms of human cognition.
Keywords: Attention/physiology, Brain Mapping/methods, Brain/anatomy & histology/physiology, chemisch / neurologisch / medikamentös / durch Substanzen, Cognition/physiology, Culture, culture sensitive, Disziplin, Environment, Humans, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Kulturinvarianz, Kulturtheorie, Neurowissenschaften, Perception/physiology, Social Behavior 2007
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(2007): Integrating simulation and theory of mind: from self to social cognition. In: Trends in cognitive sciences 11 (5), S. 194-196. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2007.02.002
2006
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(2006): How do we know the minds of others? Domain-specificity, simulation, and enactive social cognition. In: BRAIN RESEARCH (1), S. 25-35. DOI: 10.1016/j.brainres.2005.12.127
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2005.12.127 Abstract: In what ways, and to what extent, is social cognition distinguished from cognition in general? And how do data from cognitive neuroscience speak to this question? I review recent findings that argue social cognition may indeed be specialized, and at multiple levels. One particularly interesting respect in which social cognition differs from the rest of cognition is in its close interaction with the social environment. We actively probe other people in order to make inferences about what is going on in their minds (e.g., by asking them questions, and directing our gaze onto them), and we use the minds of other people as a collective resource. Experiments from our own laboratory point to the amygdala as one structure that is critically involved in such processes.
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(2006): Intentional attunement: a neurophysiological perspective on social cognition and its disruption in autism. In: BRAIN RESEARCH (1), S. 15-24. DOI: 10.1016/j.brainres.2006.01.054
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16680812 Abstract: A direct form of experiential understanding of others, "intentional attunement", is achieved by modeling their behavior as intentional experiences on the basis of the activation of shared neural systems underpinning what the others do an feel and what we do and feel. This modeling mechanism is embodied simulation. In parallel with the detached sensory description of the observed social stimuli, internal representations of the body states associated with actions, emotions, and sensations are evoked in the observer, as if he/she would be doing a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation. Mirror neuron systems are likely the neural correlate of this mechanism. By means of a shared neural state realized in two different bodies, the "objectual other" becomes "another self". A defective intentional attunement caused by a lack of embodies simulation might cause some of the social impairments of autistic individuals.
2005
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(2005): Opinion. The neural basis of human moral cognition. In: Nature reviews. Neuroscience 6 (10), S. 799-809. DOI: 10.1038/nrn1768
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16276356 Abstract: Moral cognitive neuroscience is an emerging field of research that focuses on the neural basis of uniquely human forms of social cognition and behaviour. Recent functional imaging and clinical evidence indicates that a remarkably consistent network of brain regions is involved in moral cognition. These findings are fostering new interpretations of social behavioural impairments in patients with brain dysfunction, and require new approaches to enable us to understand the complex links between individuals and society. Here, we propose a cognitive neuroscience view of how cultural and context-dependent knowledge, semantic social knowledge and motivational states can be integrated to explain complex aspects of human moral cognition.
Keywords: Beeinflussung sozial angemessenen Verhaltens, Brain/physiology, chemisch / neurologisch / medikamentös / durch Substanzen, Cognition/physiology, Disziplin, Good manners, Humans, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, Kultursensibilität, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Moral und Kognition, moralisches Wissen, Morals, Neural Pathways/physiology, Neurosciences/methods, Neurowissenschaften, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Postkasten, Psychologie, Soziale Angemessenheit, Technik 1999
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(1999): Theory of mind, emotion understanding, language, and family background: individual differences and interrelations. In: CHILD DEVELOPMENT 70 (4), S. 853-865. DOI: 10.1111/1467-8624.00061
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10446724 Abstract: Individual differences in young children's social cognition were examined in 128 urban preschoolers from a wide range of backgrounds. comprehensive assessments were made of children's false-belief understanding, emotion understanding, language abilities, and family background information was collected via parent interview. Individual differences in children's understanding of false-belief and emotion were associated with differences in language ability and with certain aspects of family background, in particular, parental occupational class and mothers' education. The number of siblings that children had did not relate to their social cognition. Individual differences in false-belief and emotion understanding were correlated, but these domains did not contribute to each other independently of age, language ability, and family background. In fact, variance in family background only contributed uniquely to false-belief understanding. The results suggest that family background has a significant impact on the development of theory of mind. The findings also suggest that understanding of false-belief and understanding of emotion may be distinct aspects of social cognition in young children.
1993
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(1993): Four systems for emotion activation: cognitive and noncognitive processes. In: Psychological Review 100 (1), S. 68-90. DOI: 10.1037/0033-295x.100.1.68
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.100.1.68 Abstract: The significant role of emotions in evolution and adaptation suggests that there must be more than 1 mechanism for generating them. Nevertheless, much of current emotion theory focuses on cognitive processes (appraisal, attribution, and construal) as the sole, or primary, means of eliciting emotions. As an alternative to this position, the present model describes 4 types of emotion-activating systems, 3 of which involve noncognitive information processing. From an evolutionary-developmental perspective, the systems maybe viewed as a loosely organized hierarchical arrangement, with neural systems, the simplest and most rapid, at the base and cognitive systems, the most complex and versatile, at the top. The emotion-activating systems operate under a number of constraints, including genetically influenced individual differences. The hierarchical organization of the systems for generating emotions provides an adaptive advantage.
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