Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Beyond Dominance and Competence. A Moral Virtue Theory of Status Attainment. In: Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc 21 (3), S. 203-227. DOI: 10.1177/1088868316649297
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27225037 Abstract: Recognition has grown that moral behavior (e.g., generosity) plays a role in status attainment, yet it remains unclear how, why, and when demonstrating moral characteristics enhances status. Drawing on philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and organizational behavior, I critically review a third route to attaining status: virtue, and propose a moral virtue theory of status attainment to provide a generalized account of the role of morality in status attainment. The moral virtue theory posits that acts of virtue elicit feelings of warmth and admiration (for virtue), and willing deference, toward the virtuous actor. I further consider how the scope and priority of moralities and virtues endorsed by a moral community are bound by culture and social class to affect which moral characteristics enhance status. I end by outlining an agenda for future research into the role of virtue in status attainment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 5
2016
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(2016): Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments. In: Journal of experimental psychology. General 145 (6), S. 772-787. DOI: 10.1037/xge0000165
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27054685 Abstract: Moral judgments play a critical role in motivating and enforcing human cooperation, and research on the proximate mechanisms of moral judgments highlights the importance of intuitive, automatic processes in forming such judgments. Intuitive moral judgments often share characteristics with deontological theories in normative ethics, which argue that certain acts (such as killing) are absolutely wrong, regardless of their consequences. Why do moral intuitions typically follow deontological prescriptions, as opposed to those of other ethical theories? Here, we test a functional explanation for this phenomenon by investigating whether agents who express deontological moral judgments are more valued as social partners. Across 5 studies, we show that people who make characteristically deontological judgments are preferred as social partners, perceived as more moral and trustworthy, and are trusted more in economic games. These findings provide empirical support for a partner choice account of moral intuitions whereby typically deontological judgments confer an adaptive function by increasing a person's likelihood of being chosen as a cooperation partner. Therefore, deontological moral intuitions may represent an evolutionarily prescribed prior that was selected for through partner choice mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record
2015
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(2015) : Civilized collaboration: Ethical architectures for enforcing legal requirements and mediating social norms in HRI: 2015 International Conference on Collaboration Technologies and Systems (CTS): Atlanta, Georgia, USA: IEEE
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/CTS.2015.7210394 Abstract: The ways in which we treat each other, typically underpinned by an ethical theory, serve as a foundation for civilized activity. Bounds and requirements are established for normal and acceptable interactions between humans. If we are to create robotic systems to reside among us, they must also adhere to a set of related values that humans operate under. This talk first describes the importance of such conventions in human-robot interaction, then outlines a way forward including the difficult research questions remaining to be confronted in ethical human robot interaction (HRI). In particular, examples involving architectures using ethical governors, moral emotions, responsibility advisors and theories of mind are described in two quite different contexts: warfare [1,2] and the maintenance of human dignity in healthcare [3-5]. Even the role of deception must be considered as an important adjunct to HRI, as it may yield more effective intentional and autonomous social robots if properly deployed [6-7]. Finally, we can consider how robots may eventually be able to engineer more socially just human beings via nudging and the ethical questions associated with using such devices [8].
Keywords: autonomous social robots, civilized activity, civilized collaboration, Computer architecture, Context, ethical architectures, ethical aspects, ethical governors, ethical human robot interaction, Ethical Theory, Ethics, HRI, human-robot interaction, ieee xplore, legal requirements, Medical services, Moral & Ethik, Moral emotions, responsibility advisors, robotic systems, Robots, service robot, Social Norms -
(2015): Gender differences in responses to moral dilemmas. A process dissociation analysis. In: Personality & social psychology bulletin 41 (5), S. 696-713. DOI: 10.1177/0146167215575731
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25840987 Abstract: The principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on its consistency with moral norms; the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action depends on its consequences. Previous research suggests that deontological judgments are shaped by affective processes, whereas utilitarian judgments are guided by cognitive processes. The current research used process dissociation (PD) to independently assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations in women and men. A meta-analytic re-analysis of 40 studies with 6,100 participants indicated that men showed a stronger preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments than women when the two principles implied conflicting decisions (d = 0.52). PD further revealed that women exhibited stronger deontological inclinations than men (d = 0.57), while men exhibited only slightly stronger utilitarian inclinations than women (d = 0.10). The findings suggest that gender differences in moral dilemma judgments are due to differences in affective responses to harm rather than cognitive evaluations of outcomes. zitiert von: 48
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