Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): The knowledge level in cognitive architectures. Current limitations and possible developments. In: COGNITIVE SYSTEMS RESEARCH 48, S. 39-55. DOI: 10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.05.001
Abstract: In this paper we identify and characterize an analysis of two problematic aspects affecting the representational level of cognitive architectures (CAs), namely: the limited size and the homogeneous typology of the encoded and processed knowledge. We argue that such aspects may constitute not only a technological problem that, in our opinion, should be addressed in order to build artificial agents able to exhibit intelligent behaviors in general scenarios, but also an epistemological one, since they limit the plausibility of the comparison of the CAs' knowledge representation and processing mechanisms with those executed by humans in their everyday activities. In the final part of the paper further directions of research will be explored, trying to address current limitations and future challenges. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Computerwissenschaft, Disziplin, Favoriten, formale Sprache, Formalisierung, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kognitive Architekturen, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), natürliche Sprache, Ontologie, Philosophie, Realtechnik, Sprachverarbeitung, Technik, Technikphilosophie, Überblick, Weltwissen 2016
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(2016): Explanatory Unification. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (4), S. 488-506. DOI: 10.1177/004839310103100402
Abstract: Explanatory unification-the urge to "explain much by little"-serves as an ideal of theorizing not only in natural sciences but also in the social sciences, most notably in economics. The ideal is occasionally challenged by appealing to the complexity and diversity of social systems and processes in space and time. This article proposes to accommodate such doubts by making a distinction between two kinds of unification and suggesting that while such doubts may be justified in regard to mere derivational unification (which serves as a formal constraint on theories), it is less justified in the case of ontological unification (which is a result of factual discovery of the actual degree of underlying unity in the world).
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(2016): Hegel's social and political philosophy. Recent debates. In: Philosophy Compass 11 (12), S. 804-817. DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12384
Abstract: This article discusses three topics that have been the subject of debate in recent scholarship on Hegel's social and political philosophy: first, the relevance of Hegel's systematic metaphysics for interpreting Hegel's social and political writings; second, the relation between recognition (Anerkennung), social institutions, and rational agency; and third, the connection between the constellation of institutions and norms that Hegel calls ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and Hegel's theory of freedom. This article provides a critical overview of the positions in these three debates. In the case of the first debate, I clarify the conceptual terrain by distinguishing between several kinds of systematicity that are at issue. In the case of the second debate, I argue that the views of two of the major participants, Axel Honneth and Robert Pippin, are in fact compatible. In the case of the third debate, I seek to clarify the connection in Hegel between two different ideas of freedom in ethical life, each of which has been emphasized by different interpreters of Hegel: the idea of freedom as non-alienation and the idea of freedom as social freedom. I conclude with a discussion of the ways in which ethical life, for Hegel, enables the freedom of individuals.
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(2016): "Before you even know ..." - Big Data und die Erkennbarkeit des Selbst. In: IRIE - International Review of Information Ethics 24 (5), S. 44-54
Abstract: Der Big Data - Technologie wird das Potenzial zugeschrieben, durch Mustererkennung in aggregierten Daten Verhaltensweisen von Personen zu prognostizieren, noch bevor diese intendiert und reflektiert würden. Zumeist widmet sich die Big Data Debatte daher den Befürchtungen möglicher Einbußen von Privatheit und Freiheit. In unserem Beitrag wählen wir jedoch einen anderen Zugriff und fragen, inwiefern die Big Data Visionen das Selbstsein betreffen, also das Konzept davon, wer ich selbst eigentlich bin. Wenn Selbstsein, Martin Heidegger zufolge, eigentlich bedeutet, in kritischer Distanz zu vorgegebenen Möglichkeiten zu leben, stellt sich die Frage, welches Kriterium hier eine klare Unterscheidbarkeit gewährleistet: Wie kann ich wissen, echt ich selbst zu sein, ohne nur wiederum andere Üblichkeiten nachzuahmen? Wir fragen daher, ob die Big Data Technologie subjektive Verzerrungen und Täuschungen über das Selbst ausschalten könnte. Hierfür wird der Begriff „Selbstsein“ bei Heidegger erarbeitet. Dabei lässt sich allerdings zeigen, dass dieser letztlich ohne Trennschärfe bleibt, da die nur negative Charakterisierung von eigentlichem Selbstsein, Heidegger zufolge, echt oder unecht ausgestaltet sein kann – der aus der Möglichkeit echter oder unechter Selbsterzählung resultierende Relativismus wurde bisher nicht hinreichend beachtet. Big Data k ann zwar uneigentliche Erzählmuster vermeiden, nicht aber uneigentliches oder eigentliches Verhalten differenzieren; ob ich z.B. manches – unecht eigentlich – aus Trotz oder Kalkül gegen mein eigenes Selbstverständnis tat, bleibt verborgen. Fazit: Es muss entweder ein Kriterium für echtes Eigentlichsein entwickelt oder der Anspruch, darüber Auskunft zu geben, verworfen werden – bei Heidegger und Big Data. Verzichtet man jedoch auf die Idee einer (echten) Eigentlichkeit verzichtet man auf den Begriff des Sel bst.
Keywords: Anerkennung, Big Data, deutsche Community, Disziplin, Favoriten, Heidegger, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Ontologie, Realtechnik, Philosophie, recognition and self, Reflexionen über MTR, Selbst, Selbst und Eigentlichkeit (Heidegger), Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie, Technik -
(2016): Theorizing the Mechanisms of Conceptual and Semiotic Space. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2), S. 283-299. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103262554
Abstract: In this piece the author takes issue with Mario Bunge's claims that conceptual and semiotic systems have "compositions, environments and structures, but no mechanisms." Structures, according to Bunge, can never be mechanisms in conceptual and semiotic systems. Contra this the author argues that in social systems, social structures (which are concept-dependent and reproduced and/or transformed, at least in part, semiotically), can be mechanisms in the sense that such structures are one of the processes in a concrete system that makes it what it is. As such, not only may conceptual and semiotic systems have mechanisms, but they may also themselves be considered some of the mechanisms that make the social what it is. As such, they can be said to possess powers and liabilities that neither reside at lower levels nor are explainable in terms of the lower level. To hold out the prospect of social explanation by conceptual and/or semiotic mechanisms does not represent an attempt to decouple these systems from material factors. What it does mean is that conceptual and/or semiotic systems can, potentially at least, play a role in social explanation; and themselves be subject to explanation.
Keywords: Bunge, cause, conceptualism, Disziplin, emergence, Emergenz, Erklärung, Erklärung des Sozialen, explanation, Interaktion, Konzept, mechanisms, Ontologie, Philosophie, realism, Realismus, reductionism, Reduktionismus, semiotics, Semiotik, social, social realism, Sozialverhalten, structures, Strukturalismus, Strukturen, Systemtheorie, Theoriebegriffe, Überblick 2015
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(2015): Hegelian recognition. In: Thesis Eleven 126 (1), S. 100-122. DOI: 10.1177/0725513614567342
Abstract: If we think of recognition as the practical relation consciously enacted by concerned individual subjects as social actors, which allows them to fulfil their intersubjectively valid social roles, this by no means exhausts the significance that recognition is accorded by Hegel. In fact the problem of recognition is central to the understanding and evaluation of Hegel's metaphysical system. Thus a close scrutiny of the presentation of self-consciousness in Phenomenology of Spirit and the interpretative difficulties it poses leads on to the question of the subject and Hegel's distinction between finite, accidental individuals and the true subject in his system: the concept of Spirit, understood not as a separate entity but as a system of relations, objectified in the historical forms of the Absolute Spirit. But what is the price of Hegel's metaphysics of subjectivity? Hegelian recognition signifies the recognition by individuals of recognition in its truth, that is, the self-recognition by finite individuals that they participate in Spirit as the true universal subject to the degree that they recognize their shared world of actions as the world of their own making. Modernity is therefore defined for Hegel as the recognition and realization of 'conscious freedom', whose telos lies in the actualization of universal reciprocal recognition that brings the unfreedom of history to an end. The idea of freedom and the thesis of the 'end of history' remain, however, the preserve of the thinking few. Hegelian recognition and with it Hegel's whole metaphysical system founders on the rock of finitude, on the unfreedom of finite human beings.
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(2015): Ontological Assumptions in Techno-Anthropological Explorations of Online Dialogue through Information Systems. In: Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 19 (2), S. 125-142. DOI: 10.5840/techne201571031
Abstract: With the widespread infusion of online technology there has been an increase in various studies investigating the practices in online communities including also philosophical perspectives. What those debates have in common is that they call for more critical thinking about the theory of online communication. Drawing on Techno-Anthropological research perspectives, our interest is placed on exploring and identifying human interactions and technology in intersectional spaces. This article explores information systems that allow for interchanges of different users. We discuss ontological assumptions that focus on understanding the kind of dialogue that can be captured between different expert groups when they utilize information systems. We present the notion of ‘dialogic’ by Mikhail Bakhtin and contextualize it through an analysis of online dialogue. Dialogic or ‘conversation and inquiry’ is discussed as being mediated through human relationships. Acknowledging the existence of at least two voices the underlying differences between dialogue partners are highlighted.
2013
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(2013): Intimacy and the Possibility for Self-Knowledge in Hegel's Dialectic of Recognition. In: Idealistic Studies 43 (3), S. 133-152. DOI: 10.5840/idstudies201411710
Abstract: Abstract The achievement of self-consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology hinges on establishing a relationship with another self-conscious being. How this is accomplished, and even that it is accomplished in Hegel's text, are topics of dispute and misunderstanding in the literature. I show how Hegel argues for this intersubjective origin of self-consciousness, first, by comparing Hegel's analysis of lord and bondsman to Sartre's analysis of intimacy. Second, I focus on two interpretive challenges. First, I argue that the staking of life comes from an other-oriented epistemological relation, and not simply from an immediate concern with dominating the other. Second, contrary to many interpretations which see the bondsman's development arising out of an isolated activity merely between himself and the products of his labor, I argue that the slave's ability to gain knowledge of himself as a self is only possible by establishing a relationship with the lord. This point is essential because, if readings of the bondsman's development as isolated from the lord are correct, then Hegel has in fact not succeeded in showing that self-consciousness only develops out of intersubjective recognition.
2011
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(2011): Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit. Zur Ontologie sozialer Tatsachen. 1. Aufl.. Berlin: SuhrkampKeywords: Analytische Philosophie, Disziplin, Favoriten, Institution, Institution Soziologie, Konventionen, Modelle/Theorien, Normen, Ontologie, Philosophie, -Q--OBV, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Normen, Sozialer Tatbestand, Spielregeltheoretische Ansätze, Spielregeltheoretische Anstätze, Sprachphilosophie
2009
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(2009): A strange hand. On self-recognition and recognition of another. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3), S. 321-342. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9127-5
Abstract: This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition, however, Husserl's account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed that self-recognition involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty's later work, describing self-recognition as the result of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one's "hereness" and "thereness". The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another.
Keywords: Anderkennung des Anderen, Anerkennung, Anerkennung des Selbst und des Anderen (Phänomenologie), Disziplin, Erkenntnistheorie, Favoriten, Husserl, IDENTIFICATION, Konstitutionen des Selbst (Anerkennung), Merleau-Ponty, Mirror image, Modelle/Theorien, Ontologie, Phänomenologie, Philosophie, RECOGNITION, Recognition of another, Rubber hand illusion, Selbst, Selbst-Anerkennung, Self-recognition, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie 2005
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(2005): Hegel's Concept of Mutual Recognition. The Limits of Self-Determination. In: The Philosophical Forum 36 (2), S. 213-220. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9191.2005.00201.x
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