Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): Punishing an “unfair” leader. People as pragmatic politicians with in-group but fair-but-biased prosecutors with out-group. In: IIMB Management Review, S. 77-90. DOI: 10.1016/j.iimb.2018.01.002
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iimb.2018.01.002 Abstract: Contrary to the fairness expected in the modern world, people seem to treat in-group members (us) better than out-group members (them). Do people then defend in-group members as politicians but prosecute out-group members in a fair-but-biased manner? Given information about injustices by a male or female manager, participants made outrage, attribution, attitude, and punishment responses to the manager. In-group defence held in the first three responses but fairness in punishment. However, the seeming fairness in punishment arose from bias suppression by outrage and mediation by attitude, and the order of mediation was from outrage to attitude and not vice versa.
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(2018): Normative expectations about fairness. The development of a charity norm in preschoolers. In: Journal of experimental child psychology 165, S. 66-84. DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2017.03.016
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28477951 Abstract: This study investigated preschool children's normative expectations about the fair distribution of resources. We examined whether preschool children have a norm of charity, that is, a norm to give more to poor individuals than to wealthy individuals. To this end, we presented 3- to 6-year-olds (N=81) with two different resource allocation situations. In one situation, an agent complied with a norm of charity by allocating more resources to a poor recipient than to a rich recipient. In the other situation, a different agent violated the norm by allocating more resources to a wealthy recipient. We assessed (a) children's verbal protest and affirmation during the resource allocation situations, (b) their punishing and rewarding behavior toward the agents, and (c) their evaluations of the agents' behavior. The results show that older (5- and 6-year-old) preschool children enforced norm-compliant behavior and protested against the norm violation of the protagonist who gave more items to the wealthy recipient, but this was not the case in younger preschool children. These findings demonstrate that older preschool children consider charity as a norm and enforce this norm toward third parties.
Keywords: Child, Child Behavior/psychology, Child, Preschool, Entstehung von Normen, Entwicklungspsychologie, Fairness, Female, Gerechtigkeit, Gerechtigkeit in Bezug auf demographische Observablen, Gleichverteilung, Humans, Male, Moral Development, Normenwandel, Psychology, Child, Punishment, Resource Allocation, Reward, Social Justice/psychology, Social Norms, Werte 2016
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(2016): Third-party punishment. Altruistic and anti-social behaviours in in-group and out-group settings. In: Journal of Cognitive Psychology 28 (4), S. 486-495. DOI: 10.1080/20445911.2016.1138961
Abstract: Explored the decision-making process involved in third-party punishment (TPP) within an economic frame, using the TPP game. Specifically, altruistic punishment (i.e., the behavior of spending one's own money, with no personal gain, to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation) was investigated. This behavior was analyzed in an ingroup and outgroup game setting to compare how individuals behave with members of their own group (ingroup) and with members of another group (outgroup). In particular, groups were defined on a real nationality basis (Chinese or Italian). Results showed altruistic punishment behavior in both experimental groups, and this tendency emerged as more prominent when faced with unfair play towards a member of one's own group. Furthermore, both groups exhibited a propensity for antisocial punishment behavior: Many participants spent small amounts of money to punish fair behavior, regardless of national group membership. zitiert von 5
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(2016) : Beschämung und Kooperation in historischen Gesellschaften - Eine evolutionäre Perspektive auf den sozialen Gebrauch moralischer Emotionen im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit In: Hennighausen, Christine; Lange, Benjamin P.; Schwab, Frank (Hg.): Evolution des Sozialen: Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers (Die Psychogenese der Menschheit), S. 25-40
Abstract: Zur Beantwortung der Frage, welche Rolle moralische Emotionen für die Evolution des sozialen Miteinanders und für die Aufrechterhaltung von gruppenspezifischen Normen und Regeln spielen, werden zunächst verschiedene neuere Theorien und Forschungen zum Verhältnis von Scham und Kooperation aus der evolutionären Anthropologie, Spieltheorie, Psychologie sowie Ökonomie diskutiert. Diese legen eine enge Verbindung von moralischen Emotionen und kooperativem Verhalten nahe. Anschließend werden empirische Befunde aus historischen Gesellschaften exemplarisch vorgestellt und im Rahmen einer evolutionären Geschichtswissenschaft interpretiert. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass beschämende Strafen im europäischen Mittelalter vor allem für leichtere Vergehen gegen den inneren Frieden einer Gruppe wie etwa bei Verleumdung und übler Nachrede, Meineid, Fälschung, Betrug, Ehebruch sowie Gotteslästerung und später auch Diebstahl verhängt wurden. Die ursprünglich aus der kirchlichen Bußpraxis stammenden Strafen entwickelten sich im städtischen Strafrecht des Hoch- und Spätmittelalters eigenständig weiter und waren zum Beginn der Neuzeit in weiten Teilen Europas fester Bestandteil des Sanktionenkatalogs. Moralische Emotionen waren somit für einen bestimmten Zeitraum ein wichtiger Baustein, mit dem eine effektive Kooperation in Gruppen, die auf gegenseitiges Vertrauen bauten, sichergestellt werden sollte. Im Fazit wird der Blick auf Funktionalisierungen der Scham in modernen Gesellschaften geweitet, und Implikationen der historischen Befunde werden diskutiert.
Keywords: COOPERATION, Emotions, Gesellschaft, Historie, History, Moral, Morality, Punishment, Rechtswissenschaft, Shame, society 2015
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(2015): Coordination, Collaboration and Cooperation. In: Interaction Studies 16 (3), S. 383-418. DOI: 10.1075/is.16.3.03ami
Abstract: Reviews the literature on the evolution and development of human cooperation, emphasizing important aspects of intercultural variation in collaborative and cooperative behavior. Humans have attained an unparalleled level of sophistication when engaging in collaborative and cooperative activities. Remarkably, the skills and motivation to engage in complex forms of collaboration and cooperation seem to emerge early on during infancy and childhood. The authors confront the different evolutionary scenarios in which cooperation may have emerged and provide the reader with a first orientation in the abundant literature on human cooperation. zitiert von 4
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(2015): The evolution and development of human cooperation. In: Interaction Studies 16 (3), S. 383-418
Abstract: Reviews the literature on the evolution and development of human cooperation, emphasizing important aspects of intercultural variation in collaborative and cooperative behavior. Humans have attained an unparalleled level of sophistication when engaging in collaborative and cooperative activities. Remarkably, the skills and motivation to engage in complex forms of collaboration and cooperation seem to emerge early on during infancy and childhood. The authors confront the different evolutionary scenarios in which cooperation may have emerged and provide the reader with a first orientation in the abundant literature on human cooperation.
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(2015) : Control, Social In: Wright, James D.: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition): Oxford: Elsevier, S. 822-827
Abstract: At the beginning of the twentieth century, social control referred to those aspects of social life contributing to the social order, in fact making social order possible. Later, in the writings of sociologists and historians studying prisons, mental institutions, and the like, social control came to mean either a label putting in motion some amplification of deviance process or the organized way in which society reacts to deviance. The term was given a pejorative overtone, meaning coercion, manipulation, and stigmatization. In contemporary criminology, the term is often used in a theory trying to explain juvenile delinquency by a failure of informal controls and to explain the level of crime and violence in neighborhoods. The concept of social control is used by anthropologists to describe the methods by which different cultures resolve conflicts and enforce norms. The social control of crime also refers to all the means specifically aimed at reducing the probability or severity of crime. In the latter case, social control is not so much conceived as the influence of society on individuals, but as the intentional influence by social actors.
2013
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(2013): Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: A volunteer's dilemma. In: Proceedings of the Royal Society B 280 (1759). DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2013.0247
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.0247 Abstract: Social control and the enforcement of social norms glue a society together. It has been shown theoretically and empirically that informal punishment of wrongdoers fosters cooperation in human groups. Most of this research has focused on voluntary and uncoordinated punishment carried out by individual group members. However, as punishment is costly, it is an open question as to why humans engage in the punishment of wrongdoers even in one-time-only encounters. While evolved punitive preferences have been advocated as proximate explanations for such behaviour, the strategic nature of the punishment situation has remained underexplored. It has been suggested to conceive of the punishment situation as a volunteer's dilemma (VOD), where only one individual's action is necessary and sufficient to punish the wrongdoer. Here, we show experimentally that implementing the punishment situation as a VOD sustains cooperation in an environment where punishers and non-punishers coexist. Moreover, we show that punishment-cost heterogeneity allows individuals to tacitly agree on only the strongest group member carrying out the punishment, thereby increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of social norm enforcement. Our results corroborate that costly peer punishment can be explained without assuming punitive preferences and show that centralized sanctioning institutions can emerge from arbitrary individual differences.
2011
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(2011): Beyond the Carrot and Stick Approach to Enforcement: An Agent-Based Model. In: European Conference on Cognitive Science
Abstract: As specified by Axelrod in his seminal work An Evolutionary Approach to Norms (Axelrod, 1986), punishment is a key mechanism to achieve the necessary social control and to enforce social norms in a self-regulated society. In this paper, we distinguish between two enforcing mechanisms, punishment and sanction, focusing on the specific ways in which they favour the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. In particular, by punishment we refer to a practice that works only by imposing a cost, while by sanction we indicate a practice that also signals the existence of a norm and that its violation is not condoned. To achieve this, we have developed a normative agent able both to punish and sanction offenders and to be affected by these enforcing mechanisms itself.The results obtained through agent-based simulation show that sanction is more effective and makes the population more resilient to sudden changes than mere punishment.
2010
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(2010): Culture and cooperation. In: Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences 365 (1553), S. 2651-2661. DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0135
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20679109 Abstract: Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper, we provide an answer by analysing the data of Herrmann et al. (2008a), who studied cooperation and punishment in 16 subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (2000)). We use analysis of variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities.
2009
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(2009): Differential roles of fairness- and compassion-based motivations for cooperation, defection, and punishment. In: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1167, S. 41-50. DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04733.x
DOI: http://www.nyas.org/annals/index.asp Abstract: The present paper briefly describes and contrasts two different motivations crucially involved in decision making and cooperation, namely fairness-based and compassion-based motivation. Whereas both can lead to cooperation in comparable social situations, we suggest that they are driven by fundamentally different mechanisms and, overall, predict different behavioral outcomes. First, we provide a brief definition of each and discuss the relevant behavioral and neuroscientific literature with regards to cooperation in the context of economic games. We suggest that, whereas both fairness- and compassion-based motivation can support cooperation, fairness-based motivation leads to punishment in cases of norm violation, while compassion-based motivation can, in cases of defection, counteract a desire for revenge and buffer the decline into iterative noncooperation. However, those with compassion-based motivation alone may get exploited. Finally, we argue that the affective states underlying fairness-based and compassion-based motivation are fundamentally different, the former driven by anger or fear of being punished and the latter by a wish for the other person's well-being.
2006
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(2006) : Well done, Robot! The importance of praise and presence in human-robot collaboration: The 15th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication, 2006: RO-MAN 2006 ; 6-8 Sept. 2006, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, United Kingdom ; proceedings: RO-MAN 2006: The 15th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication: Hatfield: 9/6/2006 - 9/8/2006. IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication; IEEE Ro-Man: Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, S. 86-90
Abstract: This study reports on an experiment in which participants had to collaborate with either another human or a robot (partner). The robot would either be present in the room or only be represented on the participants' computer screen (presence). Furthermore, the participants' partner would either make 20 % errors or 40 % errors (error rate). We automatically measured the praising and punishing behavior of the participants towards their partners and also asked the participant to estimate their own behavior. The participants unconsciously praised Aibo more than the human partner, but punished it just as much. Robots that adapt to the users' behavior should therefore pay extra attention to the users' praises, compared to their punishments
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