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  • 2017

  • Hughes, Jamie S. (2017): In a moral dilemma, choose the one you love. Impartial actors are seen as less moral than partial ones. In: The British journal of social psychology 56 (3), S. 561-577. DOI: 10.1111/bjso.12199

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28474440 

    Abstract: Although impartiality and concern for the greater good are lauded by utilitarian philosophies, it was predicted that when values conflict, those who acted impartially rather than partially would be viewed as less moral. Across four studies, using life‐or‐death scenarios and more mundane ones, support for the idea that relationship obligations are important in moral attribution was found. In Studies 1–3, participants rated an impartial actor as less morally good and his or her action as less moral compared to a partial actor. Experimental and correlational evidence showed the effect was driven by inferences about an actor's capacity for empathy and compassion. In Study 4, the relationship obligation hypothesis was refined. The data suggested that violations of relationship obligations are perceived as moral as long as strong alternative justifications sanction them. Discussion centres on the importance of relationships in understanding moral attributions. (PsycINFO D atabase Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 3

  • Magid, Rachel W.; Schulz, Laura E. (2017): Moral alchemy. How love changes norms. In: Cognition 167, S. 135-150. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.003

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28404207 

    Abstract: We discuss a process by which non-moral concerns (that is concerns agreed to be non-moral within a particular cultural context) can take on moral content. We refer to this phenomenon as moral alchemy and suggest that it arises because moral obligations of care entail recursively valuing loved ones' values, thus allowing propositions with no moral weight in themselves to become morally charged. Within this framework, we predict that when people believe a loved one cares about a behavior more than they do themselves, the moral imperative to care about the loved one's interests will raise the value of that behavior, such that people will be more likely to infer that third parties will see the behavior as wrong (Experiment 1) and the behavior itself as more morally important (Experiment 2) than when the same behaviors are considered outside the context of a caring relationship. The current study confirmed these predictions. zitiert von: 2

  • 2007

  • Eastwick, Paul W.; Finkel, Eli J.; Mochon, Daniel; Ariely, Dan (2007): Selective versus unselective romantic desire: Not all reciprocity is created equal. In: Psychological science 18 (4), S. 317-319. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01897.x
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