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1983
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(1983): Moral Arguments and Social Contexts. In: The Journal of Philosophy 80 (10). DOI: 10.2307/2026154
Abstract: Virginia Held believes it possible for intellectuals to speak from a point of view independet of existing social arrangements and interests, from which as purely external critics they should articulate for society the standards that genuine moral and aesthetiv worth decree. The issue between her and Richard Rorty turns on whether a necessary precondition of this possibility can be satisfied. Held's thesis requires that conclusions concerning genuine moral worth can be devised and justified, independently of any appeal to de facto beliefs, conventions, and institutions. This is what Rorty denies. Held's thesis also requires that everyone else, plain persons who are not intellectuals, have good reason to attend to declarations by intellectuals. This I deny for reasons which undermine Rorty's argument as well as Held's. What precludes modern intellectuals from being justly accorded the role and the responsibilities assigned to them by Held is the extent of intellectual and social dissensus. On every substantive social and moral issue intellectuals appear on opposing sides: Sowell versus Thorow, Scholem versus Arendt, Bethe versus Teller. If Held's thesis is that plain persons should attend only to intellectuals whose arguments are sound, then the intellectual task of identifying sound arguments devolves on the plain person, and any clear distinction between intellectuals and nonintellectuals is obliterated.
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