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Treffer: 1

2010
Huebner, Bryce (2010): Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness. Does anyone care about functional zombies?. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1), S. 133-155. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9126-6

Abstract: It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of 'phenomenal consciousness' are misguided-they fail to capture the interesting connection between commonsense ascriptions of pain and emotion. With this data in hand, I argue that our capacity to distinguish between 'mere things' and 'subjects of moral concern' rests, to a significant extent, on the sorts of mental states that we take a system to have.

Keywords: Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), mental states, mentale Zustände, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, phenomenal consciousness, philosophical zombie, philosophy of mind, qualia, Reflexionen über MTR, Zur Frage: Schreiben wir Assistenzsystemen mentale Zustände zu? Bzw.: durch simulierte Menschlichkeit/soziale Angemessenheit neige wir eher dazu, mentale Zustände zuzuschreiben

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