Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018) : Social groups. In: Ludwig, Kirk; Janković, Marija (Hg.): The Routledge handbook of collective intentionality: London; New York: Routledge (Routledge handbooks in philosophy), S. 277-289
Abstract: In this chapter, I outline rival positions on the ontology of social groups, ontological individualism and realism (or holism). Ontological individualism maintains that ultimately we need only refer to individual persons and their relations when describing the social world (i.e. the domain of human interaction), offering explanations of social phenomena, forming judgments or developing theories. Realism or holism by contrast is the thesis that reference to social groups is ineliminable from such discourse and that they are entities in their own right. A social group is a type of object over which we quantify in our folk and formal social scientific discourses. Next I explain two key points of dispute between individualism and holism. First, can groups be identified with sets of individuals? Second, can talk of social groups be wholly analyzed in terms of reference to individuals and their relations? If the answer to either of these questions is 'yes,' then it is possible for individuals (in relations) to enjoy the kind of explanatory priority which eviscerates holism of substance or interest. I sketch reasons why the answer to each is 'no' and propose there is at least a prima facie case to prefer holism. Third, I consider whether shared or collective intentions are necessary for individuals to constitute a social group and present reasons to show that they are not. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
2016
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(2016): Culture and the regulation of entry. In: Journal of Comparative Economics 44 (4), S. 1055-1083. DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2016.09.007
Abstract: Does culture affect the manner in which a society regulates the entry of new firms? Our results suggest it does. We find more individualistic countries regulate entry more lightly. We investigate how culture matters presenting evidence of significant interactions between individualism and formal legal and political institutions. Individualism has a greater impact on entry regulation in societies with democratic political institutions or a common law tradition. This outcome is consistent with the idea that culture influences social preference for regulation, and political and legal institutions determine the degree to which those preferences are expressed as policy outcomes. zitiert von 9
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(2016): A New Societist Social Ontology. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (2), S. 174-202. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103033002002
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(2016): Book Review. What’s So Social about Social Knowledge?. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1), S. 98-125. DOI: 10.1177/0048393104271927
2015
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(2015): A Framework for Social Ontology. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2), S. 147-167. DOI: 10.1177/0048393115613494
2012
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(2012): One’s a Crowd?. On Greenwood’s Delimitation of the Social. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (4), S. 519-530. DOI: 10.1177/0048393112454335
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393112454335 Abstract: In an effort to carve a distinct place for social facts without lapsing into a holistic ontology, John Greenwood has sought to define social phenomena solely in terms of the attitudes held by the actor(s) in question. I argue that his proposal allows for the possibility of a “lone collectivity” that is (1) unpalatable in its own right and (2) incompatible with the claim that sociology is autonomous from psychology. As such, I conclude that the relevant beliefs need to be held by more than one person.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, Durkheim, Game Theory, Gilbert, Gruppennorm, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, individualism, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, kollektive Intentionalität, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Natur & Genese von Normen, Ontology, philosophy of the social sciences, Realtechnik, social psychology, Sociology, Technik, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim) 2007
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(2007): A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding. Implications for Studying Moral Reasoning and Moral Judgment. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (6), S. 731-748. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701694110
Abstract: Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to a phenomenon they call ‘moral dumbfounding’. Moral dumbfounding occurs when someone confidently pronounces a moral judgment, then finds that he or she has little or nothing to say in defense of it. This paper addresses recent attempts by Jonathan Haidt and Marc Hauser to make sense of moral dumbfounding in terms of their respective theories of moral judgment; Haidt in terms of a ‘social intuitionist’ model of moral judgment, and Hauser in terms of his ‘Rawlsian creature’ model of moral judgment. I show that Haidt and Hauser assume that moral dumbfounding is to be explained in terms of features of a.) moral judgment that are b.) construed in terms of the intrinsic features of individuals. By contrast, I hypothesize that moral dumbfounding is to be explained in terms of moral reasoning, more specifically in terms of the social dynamics of such reasoning. Finally, I argue that this hypothesis points towards an externalistic account of both moral reasoning and moral judgment.
2003
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(2003): Nonreductive Individualism Part II—Social Causation, S. 537-559
Abstract: In Part I, the author argued for nonreductive individualism (NRI), an account of the individual-collective relation that is ontologically individualist yet rejects methodological individualism. However, because NRI is ontologically individualist, social entities and properties would seem to be only analytic constructs, and if so, they would seem to be epiphenomenal, since only real things can have causal power. In general, a nonreductionist account is a relatively weak defense of sociological explanation if it cannot provide an account of how social properties can participate in causal relations. In this article, the author extends NRI to address this weakness and provides an account of social causation that he refers to as supervenient causation.
1996
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(1996): Am Ende der Gesellschaft. Zerstort uns unsere individualistische Kultur?. In: Universitas 51 (12), S. 1188-1201
Abstract: Der fur moderne westliche Gesellschaften charakteristische Individualismus, der das Ergebnis eines langen historischen Prozesses ist, wird in seiner Bedeutung fur Kultur und Gesellschaft erortert. Nach einleitenden Anmerkungen zur Entwicklung des Individualismus werden seine Auswirkungen in den verschiedensten gesellschaftlichen Teilbereichen, etwa Wohnen, Verkehr, Konsum, Freizeit, Familie und Familienplanung, Recht und Politik erlautert. Es wird deutlich gemacht, dass die individualistische Gesellschaft gegenwartig vor tiefgreifenden Veranderungen steht, die vor allem aus ihrer Uberalterung resultieren. Diese Veranderungen, die als existentielle Krise der Gesellschaft bezeichnet werden, bedrohen die ethische und kulturelle Identitat der Gesellschaft. Eine Entwicklung hin zu einer gemeinschaftsorientierten und damit biologisch stabileren Gesellschaft wird fur unumganglich gehalten.
1994
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Beck, Ulrich; Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth (Hg.) (1994): Riskante Freiheiten. Individualisierung in modernen Gesellschaften. 1. Aufl., Erstausg. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
Abstract: Im vorliegenden Band werden die konkreten, das Leben jedes einzelnen betreffenden Formen der Individualisierung beschrieben. Es geht um das Widerspiel von neuer Freiheit und neuen Risiken in allen Lebensbereichen: um Kindheit und Jugend, um Frauen, um Liebe und Scheidung, Sozialpolitik und Armut.
Keywords: Aufsatzsammlung, Civilization, Modern, Families, Geographie: 4.415 Duitsland, Gesellschaft, Individualisering, Individualisierung, individualism, Industriegesellschaft, Levensloop, Moderniteit, social psychology, Sociale, Sozialer Wandel.Sozialstrukturelle und sozialkulturelle Bereiche, Sozialpolitik, Soziologie, Soziologie / Bindestrichsoziologien, Youssef, Ramy
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