Alle Publikationen
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2016
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(2016): Spieltheorie. Einführung, Beispiele, Experimente. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag
Abstract: Die Spieltheorie befasst sich mit dem strategischen Handeln von Personen, Firmen, Staaten oder anderen Akteuren. Das Buch behandelt die grundlegenden Konzepte anhand von Beispielen aus Politik, Soziologie und Ökonomie. Dabei kommen nicht nur Theorien und Modelle zur Sprache, sondern auch die Ergebenisse einfallsreicher Experimente, mit denen das tatsächliche Verhalten von Personen in Konfliktsituationen erforscht wird. In zehn Kapiteln, angefangen mit dem «Nash-Gleichgewicht» bis hin zur «Experimentellen Spieltheorie», werden die wichtigsten Elemente dieses faszinierenden Bereichs vorgestellt und an zahlreichen Beispielen veranschaulicht. Ein kleines Lexikon der Begriffe beschließt den Band.
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(2016): Gene-culture interaction and the evolution of the human sense of fairness. In: Scientific reports 6. DOI: 10.1038/srep32483
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27562008 Abstract: How Darwinian evolution would produce creatures with the proclivity of Darwinian generosity, most of them voluntarily giving up the immediate benefit for themselves or their genes, remains a puzzle. This study targets a problem, the origin of human sense of fairness, and uses fairness-related genes and the social manipulation of Darwinian generosity as the key variables underlying the human sense of fairness, inequity aversion, as well as their relationships within cooperation, and the anticipation foresight of the way relationships are affected by resource division, given the assumption of randomly matched partners. Here we suggest a model in which phenotype will gradually converge towards the perfect sense of fairness along with the prospect of cooperation. Later, the sense of fairness will decrease but it is never extinct. Where social manipulation of Darwinian generosity overshadows genetics, the sense of fairness could be acute to the degree of social manipulation. Above all, there still exists a threshold in the degree of social manipulation, beyond which altruism dominates selfishness in human cooperation. Finally, we propose three new directions toward more realistic scenarios stimulated by recent development of the synergy between statistical physics, network science and evolutionary game theory.
2015
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(2015): Evolutionary dynamics of group fairness. In: Journal of theoretical biology 378, S. 96-102. DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.04.025
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25936348 Abstract: The emergence and impact of fairness is commonly studied in the context of 2-person games, notably the Ultimatum Game. Often, however, humans face problems of collective action involving more than two individuals where fairness is known to play a very important role, and whose dynamics cannot be inferred from what is known from 2-person games. Here, we propose a generalization of the Ultimatum Game for an arbitrary number of players--the Multiplayer Ultimatum Game. Proposals are made to a group of responders who must individually reject or accept the proposal. If the total number of individual acceptances stands below a given threshold, the offer will be rejected; otherwise, the offer will be accepted, and equally shared by all responders. We investigate the evolution of fairness in populations of individuals by means of evolutionary game theory, providing both analytical insights and results from numerical simulations. We show how imposing stringent consensuses significantly increases the value of the proposals, leading to fairer outcomes and more tolerant players. Furthermore, we show how stochastic effects--such as imitation errors and/or errors when assessing the fitness of others--may further enhance the overall success in reaching fair collective action.
2014
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(2014): Die Anderen als sozialer Kontext. Zur Bedeutung strategischer Interaktion. In: KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 66 (S1), S. 47-66. DOI: 10.1007/s11577-014-0258-5
Abstract: Strategisches Handeln bedeutet, dass die Ergebnisse einer Handlung von "Ego" von den Handlungen der "Alteri" abhängig sind. Solche Situationen sind zahlreich im Alltagsleben, in Wirtschaft und Politik. Pioniere wie Erving Goffman oder Raymond Boudon haben die Bedeutung strategischen Handelns für die soziologische Analyse frühzeitig erkannt. Die Handlungsmöglichkeiten anderer Personen bilden den strategischen Kontext einer Person. Zwischen Kontext und Handlung besteht eine Wechselwirkung, deren Dynamik mit spieltheoretischen Modellen analysiert werden kann. Anhand der drei Beispiele Verantwortungsdiffusion, Wettbewerb und relative Deprivation, sozialer Tausch und Vertrauensproblem wird strategisches Handeln erläutert und aufgezeigt, dass strategischer Kontext die Ressourcen und die Wahrnehmung von Chancen beeinflusst, die in Analysen strategischen Handelns eben nicht als exogen angenommen werden können. Analysen des strategischen Kontexts bewegen sich sowohl auf der Mikro- als auch auf der Makroebene. Allerdings sind die strikten Rationalitätsanforderungen der Modelle nicht immer erfüllt. Oft sind evolutionäre Erklärungen angemessener, die auf weniger restriktiven Annahmen adaptiven Verhaltens basieren. (Autorenreferat) zitiert von 7
2013
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(2013): A Simulation of Rule-Breaking Behavior in Public Places. In: Social Science Computer Review 32 (4), S. 439-452. DOI: 10.1177/0894439313511186
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439313511186 Abstract: A computer simulation based on both game theory and the cellular automaton model was conducted to investigate the effects of individuals’ interactions and certain conditions on the spread of rule-breaking behavior in public places. Four decision matrices representing obedient, deviant, conforming, and contrary principles were prepared experimentally. The ratio of these principles ranged from 1:2:3:4 to 4:3:2:1 (obedient:deviant:conforming:contrary). There were a total of 24 data sets with each data set composed of 10 decision matrices. In addition to these 24 data sets, the ratio 1:1:1:1 was prepared. This data set was composed of four decision matrices. The results indicated that rule-breaking behavior spreads under the following conditions: (A) when people act according to both individual factors (e.g., their attitudes) and situational factors (e.g., their neighbors’ behavior); (B) when there are more deviant people than obedient people; (C) when the intensity of ru le-break ing behavior is higher than that of rule-obeying behavior. Condition A is an important factor. If conditions B or C are satisfied, the spread of rule-breaking behavior does not occur necessarily. At a certain probability threshold, rule-breaking behavior spreads sharply when people act based on individual factors (e.g., their attitudes); the spread of such behavior cannot be attributed solely to situational factors (e.g., neighbors' behavior). There is only a fine line between rule breaking and obeying near the probability threshold. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 6
2012
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(2012): One’s a Crowd?. On Greenwood’s Delimitation of the Social. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (4), S. 519-530. DOI: 10.1177/0048393112454335
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393112454335 Abstract: In an effort to carve a distinct place for social facts without lapsing into a holistic ontology, John Greenwood has sought to define social phenomena solely in terms of the attitudes held by the actor(s) in question. I argue that his proposal allows for the possibility of a “lone collectivity” that is (1) unpalatable in its own right and (2) incompatible with the claim that sociology is autonomous from psychology. As such, I conclude that the relevant beliefs need to be held by more than one person.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, Durkheim, Game Theory, Gilbert, Gruppennorm, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, individualism, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, kollektive Intentionalität, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Natur & Genese von Normen, Ontology, philosophy of the social sciences, Realtechnik, social psychology, Sociology, Technik, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim) -
(2012) : Children’s adaptation in multi-session interaction with a humanoid robot: 2012 IEEE RO-MAN: The 21st IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication: Paris, France: IEEE, S. 351-357
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/ROMAN.2012.6343778 Abstract: This work presents preliminary observations from a study of children (N=19, age 5-12) interacting in multiple sessions with a humanoid robot in a scenario involving game activities. The main purpose of the study was to see how their perception of the robot, their engagement, and their enjoyment of the robot as a companion evolve across multiple interactions, separated by one-two weeks. However, an interesting phenomenon was observed during the experiment: most of the children soon adapted to the behaviors of the robot, in terms of speech timing, speed and tone, verbal input formulation, nodding, gestures, etc. We describe the experimental setup and the system, and our observations and preliminary analysis results, which open interesting questions for further research.
Keywords: children adaptation, game activities, Game Theory, Games, Gestures, Humanoid Robot, Humanoid Robots, human-robot interaction, Humans, ieee xplore, Künstliche Intelligenz, medical robotics, multisession interaction, nodding, speech, speech timing, speed-and-tone, Syntactics, timing, verbal input formulation 2010
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Latzko, Brigitte (2010): Moralische Entwicklung und Erziehung in Kindheit und Adoleszenz. Zwischen Fairness und Eigeninteresse - Moralentwicklung aus ökonomischer Sicht. Unter Mitarbeit von Monika Keller und Michaela Gummerum. Göttingen [u.a.]: Hogrefe
Abstract: Ein integrativer Forschungsansatz von entwicklungspsychologischer Moralforschung und spieltheoretischen Forschungen wird vorgestellt. Im Anschluss an eine Skizzierung von Forschungsergebnissen der experimentellen Spieltheorie und Ergebnissen der psychologischen Moralforschung wird auf Untersuchungen eingegangen, in denen Eigeninteresse und Fairness in Gruppenverhandlungen über Aufteilungen analysiert wurden. Dabei werden auch Altersunterschiede bei Kindern und Jugendlichen thematisiert. Abschließend werden Implikationen für die Förderung von Empathie und moralischer Sensibilität skizziert.
2008
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Biel, Anders; Eek, Daniel; Gärling, Tommy; Gustafsson, Mathias (Hg.) (2008): New issues and paradigms in research on social dilemmas.. Toward an analysis of cooperation and fairness that includes concepts of cooperative game theory. Unter Mitarbeit von Axel Ostmann und Holger Meinhardt. New York: Springer
Abstract: Presents a game-theoretical analysis of cooperative and fair behavior. First, important concepts such as cooperation, fairness, bargaining, social dilemma, and communication are elaborated. The next sections introduce formal notation used to designate elements of noncooperative and cooperative games, and further define concepts such as core allocation and convexity. Several example games are outlined, including the CP3 game, and the HSW1 and HSW2 games. Solution concepts and properties of each example game are considered. Experimental results attained by S. Hackett et al. are reanalyzed, focusing on player efficiency and compliance, and providing geometric localization of game results. The results of the analysis suggest that common dilemma games are clear and convex, allowing for stable and efficient solutions. Players tended to compromise between the Nash equilibrium, the egalitarian standard, and the fairness standard. The interpretation of the findings considers the role of communication, the activation of behavior standards, and the equity of final results.
2004
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(2004): Why be nice? Psychological constraints on the evolution of cooperation. In: Trends in cognitive sciences 8 (2), S. 60-65. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2003.12.003
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15588809 Abstract: Animals often aid others without gaining any immediate benefits. Although these acts seem to reduce the donor's fitness, they are only apparently altruistic. Donors typically help because they or their kin receive future benefits or avoid costly punishment. Reciprocal altruism--alternating the roles of donor and recipient--has been a well-studied form of cooperation among non-kin because of its intuitive appeal in explaining human cooperation. Despite immense theoretical interest, little empirical evidence substantiates the biological importance of reciprocal altruism in non-human animals. We propose that this is because psychological mechanisms constrain its application in cooperative contexts. In particular, we contend that cognitive limitations such as temporal discounting, numerical discrimination and memory make reciprocity difficult for animals.
Keywords: Altruism, Animals, Biologie, Cooperative Behavior, Evolutionsbiologie, Game Theory, Genese, Good manners, Höflichkeit, Humans, Interaktion, Kooperation, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Problem Solving, reziproker Altruismus, Reziprozität, Social Behavior, Soziale Angemessenheit, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 1998
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(1998): Individual strategy and social structure. An evolutionary theory of institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Abstract: Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.
1996
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(1996): Fair division. From cake-cutting to dispute resolution. First published.. Cambridge; New York, NY; Oakleigh, Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press. Online verfügbar unter http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam027/95016488.html
Abstract: Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods (or 'bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, 'I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide 'envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures.
1988
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(1988): Decision theory and decision behaviour. London: Macmillan
Abstract: The book treats two approaches to decision theory: (1) the normative, purporting to determine how a 'perfectly rational' actor ought to choose among available alternatives; (2) the descriptive, based on observations of how people actually choose in real life and in laboratory experiments. The mathematical tools used in the normative approach range from elementary algebra to matrix and differential equations. Sections on different levels can be studied independently. Special emphasis is made on 'offshoots' of both theories to cognitive psychology, theoretical biology, and philosophy.
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