Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): The effects of cognitive biases and imperfectness in long-term robot-human interactions. Case studies using five cognitive biases on three robots. In: Cognitive Systems Research 43, S. 266-290. DOI: 10.1016/j.cogsys.2016.07.007
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2016.07.007 Abstract: The research presented in this paper demonstrates a model for aiding human-robot companionship based on the principle of ‘human’ cognitive biases applied to a robot. The aim of this work was to study how cognitive biases can affect human-robot companionship in long-time. In the current paper, we show comparative results of the experiments using five biased algorithms in three different robots such as ERWIN, MyKeepon and MARC. The results were analysed to determine what difference if any of biased vs unbiased interaction has on the interaction with the robot and if the participants were able to form any kind of ‘preference’ towards the different algorithms. The experimental presented show that the participants have more of a preference towards the biased algorithm interactions than the robot without the bias.
2012
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(2012): Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions. In: Social Epistemology 26 (2), S. 163-173. DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211
Abstract: In Epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker makes a tremendous contribution to theorizing the intersection of social epistemology with theories of justice. Theories of justice often take as their object of assessment either interpersonal transactions (specific exchanges between persons) or particular institutions. They may also take a more comprehensive perspective in assessing systems of institutions. This systemic perspective may enable control of the cumulative effects of millions of individual transactions that cannot be controlled at the individual or institutional levels. This is true not only with respect to the overall distribution of such goods as income and wealth, but also with respect to the goods of testimonial and hermeneutical justice. Cognitive biases that may be difficult for even epistemically virtuous individuals to correct on their own may be more susceptible to correction if we focus on the principles that should govern our systems of testimonial gathering and assessment. Hence, while Fricker's focus on individual epistemic virtue is important, we also need to consider what epistemic justice as a virtue of social systems would require. My paper will indicate some directions forward on this front, focusing on the need for integration of diverse institutions and persons engaged in inquiry.
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