Alle Publikationen
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2016
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(2016): The Mechanisms of Emergence. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2), S. 260-282. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103262553
Abstract: This article focuses on emergence in social systems. The author begins by proposing a new tool to explore the mechanisms of social emergence: multi agent based computer simulation. He then draws on philosophy of mind to develop an account of social emergence that raises potential problems for the methodological individualism of both social mechanism and of multi agent simulation. He then draws on various complexity concepts to propose a set of criteria whereby one can determine whether a given social mechanism generates emergent properties, in the sense that their explanation cannot be reduced to a mechanistic account of individuals and their interactions. This combined account helps to resolve the competing claims of methodological individualists and social realists. The author's conclusion is that the scope of mechanistic explanation may be limited due to the extreme complexity of many social systems.
Keywords: complexity, Disziplin, emergence, Emergenz, Emergenz in sozialen Systemen, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Interaktion, Komplexität, Komplexitätsforschung, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), multi agent based computer simulation, multi-agent systems, Multi-Agenten-Systeme, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Realtechnik, Reflexionen über MTR, simulation, social realism, social systems, soziale Mechanismen, Soziale Systeme, Technik -
(2016): Theorizing the Mechanisms of Conceptual and Semiotic Space. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2), S. 283-299. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103262554
Abstract: In this piece the author takes issue with Mario Bunge's claims that conceptual and semiotic systems have "compositions, environments and structures, but no mechanisms." Structures, according to Bunge, can never be mechanisms in conceptual and semiotic systems. Contra this the author argues that in social systems, social structures (which are concept-dependent and reproduced and/or transformed, at least in part, semiotically), can be mechanisms in the sense that such structures are one of the processes in a concrete system that makes it what it is. As such, not only may conceptual and semiotic systems have mechanisms, but they may also themselves be considered some of the mechanisms that make the social what it is. As such, they can be said to possess powers and liabilities that neither reside at lower levels nor are explainable in terms of the lower level. To hold out the prospect of social explanation by conceptual and/or semiotic mechanisms does not represent an attempt to decouple these systems from material factors. What it does mean is that conceptual and/or semiotic systems can, potentially at least, play a role in social explanation; and themselves be subject to explanation.
Keywords: Bunge, cause, conceptualism, Disziplin, emergence, Emergenz, Erklärung, Erklärung des Sozialen, explanation, Interaktion, Konzept, mechanisms, Ontologie, Philosophie, realism, Realismus, reductionism, Reduktionismus, semiotics, Semiotik, social, social realism, Sozialverhalten, structures, Strukturalismus, Strukturen, Systemtheorie, Theoriebegriffe, Überblick 2013
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(2013): Causally Redundant Social Objects. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (6), S. 798-809. DOI: 10.1177/0048393114521364
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393114521364 Abstract: In Elder-Vass’s response to my critical discussion of his social ontology, it is maintained (1) that a social object is not identical with but is merely composed of its suitably interrelated parts, (2) that a social object is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from its interrelated parts, and (3) that ontological individualism lacks an adequate ontological justification. In this reply, I argue that in view of (1) the so-called redescription principle defended by Elder-Vass ought to be reformulated and renamed; that the conjunction of (1) and (2) renders social objects causally redundant; and that ontological individualism can be coherently formulated and theoretically justified within Elder-Vass’s own metaphysics of objects with causal powers.
2012
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(2012): Language as Social Coordination. An evolutionary perspective. In: Interaction Studies 13 (1), S. 103-124. DOI: 10.1075/is.13.1.07fus
Abstract: Human social coordination is often mediated by language. Through verbal dialogue, people direct each other's attention to properties of their shared environment, they discuss how to jointly solve problems, share their introspections, and distribute roles and assignments. In this article, we propose a dynamical framework for the study of the coordinative role of language. Based on a review of a number of recent experimental studies, we argue that shared symbolic patterns emerge and stabilize through a process of local reciprocal linguistic alignment. Such patterns in turn come to facilitate and refine social coordination by enabling the alignment, joint construction and navigation of conceptual models and actions. Implications of the framework are illustrated and discussed in relation to a case study where dyads of interlocutors interact verbally to reach joint decisions in a perceptual discrimination task.
Keywords: adaptivity, affordances, Communication, CONSTRAINTS, Conversation, dialogue, emergence, Evolution, HUMAN-COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, INTERACTING MINDS, Interaction, Interaktion, INTERPERSONAL COORDINATION, JOINT ACTION, Koordination, Language, linguistic alignment, Linguistik, PSYCHOLINGUISTICS, social coordination, symbolic patterns 2010
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(2010): Emergence in Sociology. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (2), S. 188-223. DOI: 10.1177/0048393110381770
1998
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(1998): Modelling social action for AI agents. In: Artificial Intelligence 103 (1), S. 157-182. DOI: 10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00056-3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00056-3 Abstract: In the new AI of the 90s an important stream is artificial social intelligence. In this work basic ontological categories for social action, structure, and mind are introduced. Sociality (social action, social structure) is let emerge from the action and intelligence of individual agents in a common world. Also some aspects of the way-down—how emergent collective phenomena shape the individual mind—are examined. First, interference and dependence are defined, and then different kinds of coordination (reactive versus anticipatory; unilateral versus bilateral; selfish versus collaborative) are characterised. “Weak social action”, based on beliefs about the mind of the other agents, and “strong social action”, based on goals about others' minds and their actions, are distinguished. Special attention is paid to Goal Delegation and Goal Adoption that are considered as the basic ingredients of social commitment and contract, and then of exchange, cooperation, group action, and organisation. Different levels of delegation and then of autonomy of the delegated agent are described; and different levels of goal-adoption are shown to characterise true collaboration. Social goals in the minds of the group members are argued to be the real glue of joint activity, and the notion of social commitment, as different from individual and from collective commitment, is underlined. The necessity for modelling social objective structures and constraints is emphasised and the “shared mind” view of groups and organisations is criticised. The spontaneous and unaware emergence of a dependence structure is explained, as well as its feedback on the participants' minds and behaviours. Critical observations are presented on current confusions such as that between “social” and “collective” action, or between communication and social action. The main claims of the paper are the following: (a) The real foundation of all sociality (cooperation, competition, groups, organisation, etc.) is the individual social action and mind. One cannot reduce or connect action at the collective level to action at the individual level unless one passes through the social character of the individual action, (b) Important levels of coordination and cooperation necessarily require minds and cognitive agents (beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.). (c) However, cognition, communication and agreement are not enough for modelling and implementing cooperation: emergent pre-cognitive structures and constraints should be formalised, and emergent forms of cooperation are needed also among planning and deliberative agents, (d) We are going towards a synthetic paradigm in AI and Cognitive Science, reconciling situatedness and plans, reactivity and mental representations, cognition, emergence and self-organisation.
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