Alle Publikationen
2019
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(2019) : Beyond Programming: Can Robots’ Norm-Violating Actions Elicit Mental State Attributions?: 2019 14th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI): Daegu, Korea: IEEE, S. 530-531
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/HRI.2019.8673293 Abstract: Social perceivers often view a human agent’s norm-violating behavior as diagnostic of that person’s mental states, while behaviors that conform to norms are viewed as less informative. We developed a series of stimulus videos depicting a DRC-HUBO robot engaging in norm-violating and norm-conforming behaviors. We explored the hypothesis that robots’ norm-violating actions may invite social perceivers to increase their mental state attributions in a similar manner as they do in humans. Surprisingly, we found that norm-conforming behaviors appear to be at least as conducive as norm-violating behaviors, and perhaps even moreso, to mental state attribution to robotic agents.
Keywords: action explanation, actions elicit mental state attributions, agency, Artificial intelligence, behavioural sciences computing, Cognition, control engineering computing, DRC-HUBO, DRC-HUBO robot, human agent norm-violating behavior, Humanoid Robots, human-robot interaction, ieee xplore, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mobile robots, multi-agent systems, norms, PSYCHOLOGY, robot programming, robotic agents, social perceivers, theory of mind, Videos 2018
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(2018): Spontaneous theory of mind is reduced for nonhuman-like agents as compared to human-like agents. In: Psychological Research, S. 1571-1580. DOI: 10.1007/s00426-018-1000-0
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1000-0 Abstract: Theory of Mind research has shown that we spontaneously take into account other’s beliefs. In the current study, we investigate, with a spontaneous Theory of Mind (ToM) task, if this belief representation also applies to nonhuman-like agents. In a series of three experiments, we show here that we do not spontaneously take into account beliefs of nonhuman-like others, or at least we do it to a lesser extent than for human and human-like agents. Further, the experience we have with the other agent, in our case a dog, does not modulate spontaneous ToM: the same pattern of results was obtained when dog owners and no owners were compared. However, when more attention was attracted to the dog behavior, participants’ behavior was influenced by the beliefs of the dog. In sum, spontaneous belief representation seems to be primarily restricted to human and human-like agents, but can be facilitated when more attention is drawn to a nonhuman-like agent. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords: theory of mind, Verhaltensforschung -
(2018): SEAI. Social Emotional Artificial Intelligence Based on Damasio’s Theory of Mind. In: Frontiers in Robotics and AI 5. DOI: 10.3389/frobt.2018.00006
Abstract: A socially intelligent robot must be capable to extract meaningful information in real time from the social environment and react accordingly with coherent human-like behavior. Moreover, it should be able to internalize this information, to reason on it at a higher level, build its own opinions independently, and then automatically bias the decision-making according to its unique experience. In the last decades, neuroscience research highlighted the link between the evolution of such complex behavior and the evolution of a certain level of consciousness, which cannot leave out of a body that feels emotions as discriminants and prompters. In order to develop cognitive systems for social robotics with greater human-likeliness, we used an “understanding by building” approach to model and implement a well-known theory of mind in the form of an artificial intelligence, and we tested it on a sophisticated robotic platform. The name of the presented system is SEAI (Social Emotional Artificial Intelligence), a cognitive system specifically conceived for social and emotional robots. It is designed as a bio-inspired, highly modular, hybrid system with emotion modeling and high-level reasoning capabilities. It follows the deliberative/reactive paradigm where a knowledge-based expert system is aimed at dealing with the high-level symbolic reasoning, while a more conventional reactive paradigm is deputed to the low-level processing and control. The SEAI system is also enriched by a model that simulates the Damasio’s theory of consciousness and the theory of Somatic Markers. After a review of similar bio-inspired cognitive systems, we present the scientific foundations and their computational formalization at the basis of the SEAI framework. Then, a deeper technical description of the architecture is disclosed underlining the numerous parallelisms with the human cognitive system. Finally, the influence of artificial emotions and feelings, and their link with the robot’s beliefs and decisions have been tested in a physical humanoid involved in Human–Robot Interaction (HRI).
Keywords: Abstraktionsfähigkeit, Bewusstsein, Damasio's theory of consciousness, emotion, Fähigkeit, sich eine eigene Meinung zu bilden, Intelligenz, Interaktionspartner, Mensch oder Maschine, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Schnelligkeit der Informationsverarbeitung (real time), theory of mind, Theory of Somatic Markers -
(2018): Differences in the Theory of Mind profiles of patients with anorexia nervosa and individuals on the autism spectrum: A meta-analytic review. In: Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 90, S. 146-163. DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.04.009
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.04.009 Abstract: Background This meta-analytic review examines the theory of mind profiles in both patients with anorexia nervosa (AN) and autistic individuals. Methodology The studies examining theory of mind were divided into the following categories: emotional theory of mind, understanding simple social situations, understanding complex social interactions, and implicit social attribution. All included studies investigated differences between healthy control (HCs) individuals and people with AN or autistic people. Differences in theory of mind profile between people with AN and autistic people were explored by conducting moderator analyses. Results People with AN and autistic people showed a similar theory of mind profile, but autistic individuals showed greater difficulties, particularly in emotional theory of mind. Conclusions Although both people with AN and autistic people have significant difficulties in all aspects of theory of mind relative to the HCs, some differences in the underlying profile may be present. However, due to relative paucity of theory of mind research among people with AN, further research is still needed before firm conclusion can be drawn.
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(2018): Theory of mind and humanoid robots from a lifespan perspective. In: Zeitschrift für Psychologie 226 (2), S. 98-109. DOI: 10.1027/2151-2604/a000326
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1027/2151-2604/a000326 Abstract: This review focuses on some relevant issues concerning the relationship between theory of mind (ToM) and humanoid robots. Humanoid robots are employed in different everyday-life contexts, so it seems relevant to question whether the relationships between human beings and humanoids can be characterized by a mode of interaction typical of the relationships between human beings, that is, the attribution of mental states. Because ToM development continuously undergoes changes from early childhood to late adulthood, we adopted a lifespan perspective. We analyzed contributions from the literature by organizing them around the partition between 'mental states and actions' and 'human-like features.' Finally, we considered how studying human–robot interaction, within a ToM context, can contribute to our understanding of the intersubjective nature of this interaction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): On the interaction of social affect and cognition: empathy, compassion and theory of mind. In: Emotion-cognition interactions 19, S. 1-6. DOI: 10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.07.010
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.07.010 Abstract: Empathy, compassion and Theory of Mind (ToM) are central topics in social psychology and neuroscience. While empathy enables the sharing of others’ emotions and may result in empathic distress, a maladaptive form of empathic resonance, or compassion, a feeling of warmth and concern for others, ToM provides cognitive understanding of someone else's thoughts or intentions. These socio-affective and socio-cognitive routes to understanding others are subserved by separable, independent brain networks. Nonetheless they are jointly required in many complex social situations. A process that is critical for both, empathy and ToM, is self-other distinction, which is implemented in different temporoparietal brain regions. Thus, adaptive social behavior is a result of dynamic interplay of socio-affective and socio-cognitive processes.
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(2018): Theory of a machine's mind. In: New Scientist 237 (3167), S. 6-7. DOI: 10.1016/S0262-4079(18)30365-8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(18)30365-8 Abstract: MACHINES are getting to know each other better. An artificial intelligence, developed by Google-owned research firm DeepMind, can now pass an important psychological assessment that most children only develop the skills to pass at around age 4. Its aptitude in …
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(2018): Interventions for the treatment of theory of mind deficits in schizophrenia: Systematic literature review. In: Psychiatry research 267, S. 37-47. DOI: 10.1016/j.psychres.2018.05.001
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2018.05.001 Abstract: Theory of Mind (ToM) plays a central role in regulating social interactions and its impairment is consistently reported in schizophrenia. Regarding schizophrenia, ToM is usually discussed as a sub-domain of social cognition. Since social cognitive deficits have drawn the attention of researchers, a variety of novel treatment techniques and approaches targeting social cognitive deficits have been developed. Encouraging results have repeatedly been reported on the modifiability of social cognitive impairment through these techniques. However, emotional perception seems to be over-represented in these approaches at the expense of other areas, such as ToM. This article presents a systematic review on the social cognitive interventions of the last 10 years, which focused on the remediation of ToM or used techniques primarily focusing on one or more social cognitive domains other than ToM, but with hypothetical effects on it. The aim of our systematic review was to compare these intervention techniques in order to see how effective they are in the remediation of ToM, and to find the best techniques to ameliorate ToM deficits in schizophrenia. According to our findings targeted ToM intervention produced more improvement in ToM tasks, while data regarding non-ToM interventions showed contradictory results with limited effects on ToM.
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(2018): Theory of mind across the lifespan?. In: Zeitschrift für Psychologie 226 (2), S. 136-138. DOI: 10.1027/2151-2604/a000330
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1027/2151-2604/a000330 Abstract: Theory of mind develops from infancy to late life. We need to know more about that, including better information about progressions that characterize lifespan trajectories of understanding, and how humans understand both ordinary and extraordinary minds. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords: Entwicklungspsychologie, theory of mind 2017
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(2017): 'Why are there limits on theory of mind use? Evidence from adults’ ability to follow instructions from an ignorant speaker': Corrigendum. In: The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (1). DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2016.1178876
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2016.1178876 Abstract: Reports an error in 'Why are there limits on theory of mind use? Evidence from adults' ability to follow instructions from an ignorant speaker' by Ian A. Apperly, Daniel J. Carroll, Dana Samson, Glyn W. Humphreys, Adam Qureshi and Graham Moffitt (The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2010[Jun], Vol 63[6], 1201-1217). Ongoing work after publication has uncovered an inaccuracy in the reporting of one of the studies in this article. The updated text replacing the first three lines of the methods section for Experiments 2a and 2b on page 1209 of the original article is provided in the corrigendum (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record [rid]2010-10502-012[/rid]). Keysar et al. (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003) report that adults frequently failed to use their conceptual competence for theory of mind (ToM) in an online communication game where they needed to take account of a speaker's perspective. The current research reports 3 experiments investigating the cognitive processes contributing to adults' errors. In Experiments 1 and 2 the frequency of adults' failure to use ToM was unaffected by perspective switching. In Experiment 3 adults made more errors when interpreting instructions according to the speaker's perspective than according to an arbitrary rule. We suggest that adults are efficient at switching perspectives, but that actually using what another person knows to interpret what they say is relatively inefficient, giving rise to egocentric errors during communication. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords: Kommunikation, theory of mind -
(2017): The Eyes as Window to the Mind. In: The American journal of psychiatry 174 (1), S. 1-2. DOI: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2016.16101188
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(2017): Nonverbal components of Theory of Mind in typical and atypical development. In: Early non-verbal forms of social cognition 48, S. 54-62. DOI: 10.1016/j.infbeh.2016.11.001
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infbeh.2016.11.001 Abstract: To successfully navigate the human social world one needs to realize that behavior is guided by mental states such as goals and beliefs. Humans are highly proficient in using mental states to explain and predict their conspecific’s behavior, which enables adjusting one’s own behavior in online social interactions. Whereas according to recent studies even young infants seem to integrate others’ beliefs into their own behavior, it is unclear what processes contribute to such competencies and how they may develop. Here we analyze a set of possible nonverbal components of theory of mind that may be involved in taking into account others’ mental states, and discuss findings from typical and atypical development. To track an agent’s belief one needs to (i) pay attention to agents that might be potential belief holders, and identify their focus of attention and their potential belief contents; (ii) keep track of their different experiences and their consequent beliefs, and (iii) to make behavioral predictions based on such beliefs. If an individual fails to predict an agent’s behavior depending on the agent’s beliefs, this may be due to a problem at any stage in the above processes. An analysis of the possible nonverbal processes contributing to belief tracking and their functioning in typical and atypical development aims to provide new insights into the possible mechanisms that make human social interactions uniquely rich.
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(2017): Applying “theory of mind”: Theory and experiments. In: Games and Economic Behavior 106, S. 209-226. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.008
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.008 Abstract: We investigate our capacity to attribute preferences to others. This ability is intrinsic to game theory, and is a central component of “Theory of Mind”, perhaps the capstone of social cognition. This component of theory of mind allows individuals to learn more rapidly in strategic environments with an element of novelty. We show that the capacity to attribute preferences yields an advantage over less sophisticated approaches to strategic interaction (e.g. reinforcement learning) because it allows agents to extrapolate to novel circumstances information about counterparts' preferences that was learned previously. We report experiments investigating this capacity in extensive form games. We find significant learning of others' preferences, providing evidence for the presence and effectiveness of this aspect of theory of mind. Moreover, scores on survey measures of autism-spectrum tendencies are significant determinants of individual learning, so our notion of theory of mind is related to the notion as understood in psychology.
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(2017): Theory of Mind and Empathy. Part I - Model of Social Emotional Thinking. In: Fundamenta Informaticae 150 (2), S. 221-230. DOI: 10.3233/FI-2017-1466
Abstract: There are two very different approaches to understand functioning of the brain. First, there is a huge progress in the research of the neurological and neurophysiological properties of different brain substructures, circuits, networks, single cells, synapses and their molecular properties. It contributes to the progress of research in the fields of basic medical sciences and the dramatic increase in average life expectancy. On the another side that does not directly follows neurological developments, it is our introspection related to individual ways of thinking in order to solve different problems that also involve human creativity (cognitive theory of mind). We use many diverse ways of thinking, and they depend on different circumstances. Especially interesting are influences of intuition, feelings and emotions on our creativity, which is in a large part are also related to the social interactions (affective empathy). In this work, we formalise emotional scales and transfer of emotions between individuals (social emotional thinking). We also demonstrate a continuity of the emotion transfer mappings, and an importance of the interactions between emotional faces. It is not only human specific to show and to react to face emotions, but strong and wide human social interactions are based on the precise emotional social thinking. By measuring critical values of face deformations that may influence mutual emotions, we can test precision and tolerance of human visual and emotional systems. By introduction indiscernibility relations between individual reading of face parts deformation, we have used rough set theory to probe social emotional thinking. As one of us have demonstrated that the visual system has properties that follows rough set theory (cognitive theory of mind), this work extends this concept to the social emotional interactions (cognitive and affective theory of mind). As in modern world IT - information technology - has became driving factor in the process of globalisation by creating effective channels of information exchange; hence it becomes extremely important to analyse emotional meaning (cognitive empathy) for this vast information flow. By using as described here, rough set theory to determine, which parts of information have significant emotional influence, our model may give grounds to increase the collective well-being.
Keywords: theory of mind -
(2017): Formalizing emotion concepts within a Bayesian model of theory of mind. In: Emotion 17, S. 15-21. DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.04.019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.04.019 Abstract: Sensitivity to others’ emotions is foundational for many aspects of human life, yet computational models do not currently approach the sensitivity and specificity of human emotion knowledge. Perception of isolated physical expressions largely supplies ambiguous, low-dimensional, and noisy information about others’ emotional states. By contrast, observers attribute specific granular emotions to another person based on inferences of how she interprets (or ‘appraises’) external events in relation to her other mental states (goals, beliefs, moral values, costs). These attributions share neural mechanisms with other reasoning about minds. Situating emotion concepts in a formal model of people’s intuitive theories about other minds is necessary to effectively capture humans’ fine-grained emotion understanding.
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(2017): Theory of mind is just behavior. In: Current Psychiatry Reviews 13 (2), S. 82-89. DOI: 10.2174/1573400513666170503115212
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2174/1573400513666170503115212 Abstract: The term Theory of Mind (ToM) has been used to refer to the ability of an individual to make inferences about what others may be thinking or feeling and to predict what they may do in a given situation based on those inferences—in other words, the ability to take another person’s perspective. Unfortunately, most researchers talk about ToM as if it were a cognitive process, which, if true, means that it can never be studied directly. As a result, various tests of behavior have been devised from which ToM (or the lack thereof) is deduced. As with all cognitive processes, inferring ToM based solely on observed behavior is problematic because there is no direct and independent evidence of the ToM. And, because ToM itself is not directly observable, the question remains as to how one might teach it to individuals diagnosed with psychological disorders who have ToM deficits. In the present essay, I argue that it is more parsimonious and ultimately more practical to view ToM as only a label for a set of observed behaviors that are acquired according to relatively straightforward principles of learning and, thus, also capable of being taught to individuals diagnosed with psychological disorders who lack such behaviors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords: theory of mind, Verhaltensforschung -
(2017): Venturing into the uncanny valley of mind—The influence of mind attribution on the acceptance of human-like characters in a virtual reality setting. In: Cognition 160, S. 43-50. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.12.010
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.12.010 Abstract: For more than 40years, the uncanny valley model has captivated researchers from various fields of expertise. Still, explanations as to why slightly imperfect human-like characters can evoke feelings of eeriness remain the subject of controversy. Many experiments exploring the phenomenon have emphasized specific visual factors in connection to evolutionary psychological theories or an underlying categorization conflict. More recently, studies have also shifted away focus from the appearance of human-like entities, instead exploring their mental capabilities as basis for observers' discomfort. In order to advance this perspective, we introduced 92 participants to a virtual reality (VR) chat program and presented them with two digital characters engaged in an emotional and empathic dialogue. Using the same pre-recorded 3D scene, we manipulated the perceived control type of the depicted characters (human-controlled avatars vs. computer-controlled agents), as well as their alleged level of autonomy (scripted vs. self-directed actions). Statistical analyses revealed that participants experienced significantly stronger eeriness if they perceived the empathic characters to be autonomous artificial intelligences. As human likeness and attractiveness ratings did not result in significant group differences, we present our results as evidence for an “uncanny valley of mind“ that relies on the attribution of emotions and social cognition to non-human entities. A possible relationship to the philosophy of anthropocentrism and its “threat to human distinctiveness” concept is discussed.
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(2017): Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences. In: Journal of experimental psychology. General 146 (11), S. 1586-1605. DOI: 10.1037/xge0000350
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28805441 Abstract: Metaethical judgments refer to judgments about the information expressed by moral claims. Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are akin to facts, whereas moral subjectivists generally believe that moral claims are more akin to preferences. Evidence from developmental and social psychology has generally favored an objectivist view; however, this work has typically relied on few examples, and analyses have disallowed statistical generalizations beyond these few stimuli. The present work addresses whether morals are represented as fact-like or preference-like, using behavioral and neuroimaging methods, in combination with statistical techniques that can (a) generalize beyond our sample stimuli, and (b) test whether particular item features are associated with neural activity. Behaviorally, and contrary to prior work, morals were perceived as more preference-like than fact-like. Neurally, morals and preferences elicited common magnitudes and spatial patterns of activity, particularly within the dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a critical region for social cognition. This common DMPFC activity for morals and preferences was present across whole-brain conjunctions, and in individually localized functional regions of interest (targeting the theory of mind network). By contrast, morals and facts did not elicit any neural activity in common. Follow-up item analyses suggested that the activity elicited in common by morals and preferences was explained by their shared tendency to evoke representations of mental states. We conclude that morals are represented as far more subjective than prior work has suggested. This conclusion is consistent with recent theoretical research, which has argued that morality is fundamentally about regulating social relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record zitiert von: 2
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(2017): When robots appear to have a mind: The human perception of machine agency and responsibility. In: New Ideas in Psychology, S. 93-100. DOI: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2017.11.001
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2017.11.001 Abstract: An important topic in the field of social and developmental psychology is how humans attribute mental traits and states to others. With the growing presence of robots in society, humans are confronted with a new category of social agents. This paper presents an empirical study demonstrating how psychological theory may be used for the human interpretation of robot behavior. Specifically, in this study we applied Weiner's Theory of Social Conduct as a theoretical background for studying attributions of agency and responsibility to NAO robots. Our results suggest that if a robot's failure appears to be caused by its (lack of) effort, as compared to its (lack of) ability, human observers attribute significantly more agency and, although to a lesser extent, more responsibility to the robot. However, affective and behavioral responses to robots differ in such cases as compared to reactions to human agents. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)
2016
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(2016): Why (and how) should we study the interplay between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind, and inhibitory control to understand moral cognition?. In: Psychonomic bulletin & review 23 (6), S. 1660-1680. DOI: 10.3758/s13423-016-1042-5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-016-1042-5 Abstract: Findings in the field of experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have shed new light on our understanding of the psychological and biological bases of morality. Although a lot of attention has been devoted to understanding the processes that underlie complex moral dilemmas, attempts to represent the way in which individuals generate moral judgments when processing basic harmful actions are rare. Here, we will outline a model of morality which proposes that the evaluation of basic harmful actions relies on complex interactions between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities, and inhibitory control resources. This model makes clear predictions regarding the cognitive processes underlying the development of and ability to generate moral judgments. We draw on data from developmental and cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology research to evaluate the model and propose several conceptual and methodological improvements that are needed to further advance our understanding of moral cognition and its development. zitiert von 12
Keywords: Causality, Emotional Control, Emotions, Empathy, Executive Function, Humans, Inhibition (Psychology), Intention Medical Subject Headings (MeSH): Arousal, Kognitionswissenschaften, Moral, Morality, Morals, Neurowissenschaften, Response Inhibition, Social Perception, theory of mind, Thinking -
(2016): Theory of mind for processing unexpected events across contexts. In: Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 11 (8), S. 1183-1192. DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsw032
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsw032 Abstract: Theory of mind, or mental state reasoning, may be particularly useful for making sense of unexpected events. Here, we investigated unexpected behavior across both social and non-social contexts in order to characterize the precise role of theory of mind in processing unexpected events. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine how people respond to unexpected outcomes when initial expectations were based on (i) an object’s prior behavior, (ii) an agent’s prior behavior and (iii) an agent’s mental states. Consistent with prior work, brain regions for theory of mind were preferentially recruited when people first formed expectations about social agents vs non-social objects. Critically, unexpected vs expected outcomes elicited greater activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, which also discriminated in its spatial pattern of activity between unexpected and expected outcomes for social events. In contrast, social vs non-social events elicited greater activity in precuneus across both expected and unexpected outcomes. Finally, given prior information about an agent’s behavior, unexpected vs expected outcomes elicited an especially robust response in right temporoparietal junction, and the magnitude of this difference across participants correlated negatively with autistic-like traits. Together, these findings illuminate the distinct contributions of brain regions for theory of mind for processing unexpected events across contexts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2016): Plans, habits, and theory of mind. In: PLOS ONE 11 (9)
Abstract: Human success and even survival depends on our ability to predict what others will do by guessing what they are thinking. If I accelerate, will he yield? If I propose, will she accept? If I confess, will they forgive? Psychologists call this capacity 'theory of mind.' According to current theories, we solve this problem by assuming that others are rational actors. That is, we assume that others design and execute efficient plans to achieve their goals, given their knowledge. But if this view is correct, then our theory of mind is startlingly incomplete. Human action is not always a product of rational planning, and we would be mistaken to always interpret others’ behaviors as such. A wealth of evidence indicates that we often act habitually—a form of behavioral control that depends not on rational planning, but rather on a history of reinforcement. We aim to test whether the human theory of mind includes a theory of habitual action and to assess when and how it is deployed. In a series of studies, we show that human theory of mind is sensitive to factors influencing the balance between habitual and planned behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords: theory of mind, Verhaltensforschung -
(2016): Making sense of social robots: A structural analysis of the layperson's social representation of robots. In: Revue Européenne de Psychologie Appliquée/European Review of Applied Psychology 66 (6), S. 277-289. DOI: 10.1016/j.erap.2016.07.001
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erap.2016.07.001 Abstract: Introduction Given their novelty, social robots (i.e., robots using natural language, displaying and recognizing emotions) will generate uncertainty among users. Social representations allow making sense of the new, drawing from existing knowledge. Objective A free association questionnaire was administered to 212 Portuguese adults to identify the social representation of robot. Method Data was analysed with EVOC 2000 and SIMI 2000 software. Results The social representation of robot is organized around the ideas of technology, help and future. Differences in the representation according to age, gender and level of education where also identified. Conclusion The social representation of robot is marked by the conception of it as a tool. This contrasts with the concept of social robots as social agents. Implications for social robot's acceptance are discussed. Résumé Introduction Étant donnée leur nouveauté, les robots sociaux (i.e., qui utilisent un langage naturel et montrent et reconnaissent des émotions) vont générer un sentiment d’incertitude chez les futurs utilisateurs. Les représentations sociales permettent de donner du sens aux choses nouvelles à partir des connaissances préexistantes. Objectif Les participants (n=212 adultes portugais) effectuèrent une tâche d’association libre dans le but d’identifier la représentation sociale du robot. Méthode Les données ont été traitées à l’aide des programmes EVOC 2000 et SIMI 2000. Résultats La représentation sociale du robot est organisée autour des idées de technologie, d’aide et d’avenir. Des différences en fonction de l’âge, du genre et du niveau d’éducation sont également identifiées. Conclusion La représentation sociale du robot est marquée par la conception de celui-ci comme un outil. Cela contraste avec le concept de robots sociaux en tant qu’agents sociaux. Les implications pour l’acceptation des robots sociaux sont discutées.
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(2016): A general theory of sympathy, mind-reading, and social interaction, with an application to the Prisoners' Dilemma. In: Social Science Information 39 (4), S. 567-634. DOI: 10.1177/053901800039004003
Abstract: A theory of sympathy is advanced, based on the insights of theorists such as Hume, Smith, Cooley, Mead, and Heider, and drawing an modern findings in sociology and social psychology. The process of identifying with another person is determined by the perception of distance from the other, may involve non-conscious imitation, and lead to an enlarged self-interest. The cave of the theory is a model balancing physical distance, psychological similarity and familiarity, affection, and evaluation. Great emphasis is placed on the incarnation of social actors, the importance of their bodies and sentiments, and the effects of the interaction order. This theoretical structure is applied to the Prisoners' Dilemma in order to derive a large set of predictions that are tested successfully against the wealth of experimental results.
Keywords: theory of mind 2015
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(2015): Soziales Verständnis. Theoretische Grundlagen, Konstruktion und Validierung zweier Testaufgaben zum Kernkonstrukt der sozialen Intelligenz. punkt um FILM, Magdeburg.
Abstract: Zwei multimediabasierte Testaufgaben zur Messung von sozialem Verständnis im Rahmen des integrativen Modells der sozialen Intelligenz von S. Weis und H.-M. Süß werden entwickelt und ihre Konstrukt- und Kriteriumsvalidität wird überprüft. Zudem wurde die Abhängigkeit der Befunde von den angewandten Scoring-Methoden betrachtet. Insgesamt wurden drei Studien durchgeführt. Im Fokus der ersten Untersuchung (N = 155) standen die psychometrischen Eigenschaften der beiden neukonstruierten Szenarien "Katrin" und "Daniel", ihre faktoranalytische Passung in den Untertest zum sozialen Verständnis des "Magdeburger Test zur Sozialen Intelligenz" (MTSI) sowie die Einbettung in das Netzwerk anderer Konstrukte. Auf der Grundlage einer Itemanalyse der Daten der ersten Studie wurden schwache Items aus den beiden Szenarien entfernt. Die psychometrischen Eigenschaften der gekürzten Versionen wurden in der zweiten Studie (N = 103) ermittelt. Zudem wurde untersucht, ob Selbstberichtsverfahren geeignet sind, soziales Verständnis akkurat zu erfassen und ob die Variable Geschlecht die Genauigkeit der Selbsteinschätzung moderiert. Hierzu wurde ein Selbstberichtsfragebogen zum sozialen Verständnis (SSV) entwickelt, der eng an die Anforderungen der Testaufgaben zum sozialen Verständnis des MTSI angelehnt wurde. Das Selbstberichtsinventar SSV wurde zusammen mit weiteren Selbstberichtsfragebogen vor der Bearbeitung der Szenarien vorgegeben. Nach der Bearbeitung der Neukonstruktionen wurden die Probanden gebeten, den SSV erneut zu beantworten. Aufgrund der Selbsterfahrung im Leistungstest sollte die Einschätzung der eigenen sozialen Fähigkeiten realistischer werden, sodass systematische Zusammenhänge zwischen den Szenarien und dem Selbstberichtsfragebogen zum sozialen Verständnis erwartet wurden. Ziel der dritten Untersuchung (N = 43) war eine erste Kriteriumsvalidierung der neuen Testaufgaben. Für die neuen Testaufgaben zum sozialen Verständnis des MTSI konnten gute psychometrische Eigenschaften und erste Hinweise auf Konstruktvalidität aufgezeigt werden. Zudem unterstützen die durchgeführten Untersuchungen die präferierte Verwendung von "Target Scoring" im Vergleich zu "Group Consensus Scoring".
Keywords: Empathie, Empathy, Humanwissenschaften, Intelligence, Intelligenz, Personality Scales & Inventories, Personality Traits & Processes, Persönlichkeitseigenschaften und Persönlichkeitsprozesse, Persönlichkeitstests, Role Taking, Rollenübernahme, Scoring (Testing), Social Perception, Soziale Intelligenz, Soziale Wahrnehmung, Test Validity, Testvalidität, Testwertvergabe, theory of mind