Alle Publikationen
- <<
- <
- 1
2016
-
(2016): Sozialisation. Über die Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Individuum und die Bedingungen von Identität. 2. Aufl. 2016. Wiesbaden: Springer VS (Studientexte zur Soziologie)
Abstract: Wie ist soziale Ordnung möglich und wie kommt sie zustande? -- Wie erfolgt die Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Individuum? -- Wie werden wir, was wir sind, und wie gewinnen wir Identität? -- Welcher Kompetenzen bedarf es, um uns in den Interaktionen des Alltags zu behaupten? Sozialisation ist eine Antwort auf die soziologische Grundfrage nach der Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Individuum. Die drei Fragen, wie wir werden, was wir sind, wie wir durch unser Denken und Handeln gesellschaftliche Ordnung reproduzieren, aber auch gestalten, und wie wir unsere Identität in der Interaktion mit Anderen herstellen und wahren, standen schon am Anfang der Soziologie. Sie sind in der fortgeschrittenen Moderne noch drängender geworden. Das Lehrbuch stellt die breite soziologische Diskussion von ihren Anfängen bis in die allerjüngste Zeit vor. Für die zweite Auflage wurden alle Kapitel überarbeitet und aktualisiert und die theoretische Diskussion erheblich erweitert. Der Inhalt Wie ist soziale Ordnung möglich und wie kommt sie zustande? Wie erfolgt die Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Individuum? Wie werden wir, was wir sind, und wie gewinnen wir Identität? Welcher Kompetenzen bedarf es, um uns in den Interaktionen des Alltags zu behaupten? Die Zielgruppen Studierende der Soziologie, der Pädagogik, der Psychologie und der Sozialarbeit Studierende aus Studiengängen für das Lehramt und für erziehende Berufe Alle, die schon immer an Antworten auf die oben genannten Fragen interessiert waren Die Autoren Dr. Dr. Heinz Abels, em. Univ.-Prof. am Institut für Soziologie der FernUniversität in Hagen. Dr. Alexandra König, Akademische Rätin in der Fachgruppe Soziologie der Bergischen Universität Wuppertal
2013
-
(2013): Causally Redundant Social Objects. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (6), S. 798-809. DOI: 10.1177/0048393114521364
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393114521364 Abstract: In Elder-Vass’s response to my critical discussion of his social ontology, it is maintained (1) that a social object is not identical with but is merely composed of its suitably interrelated parts, (2) that a social object is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from its interrelated parts, and (3) that ontological individualism lacks an adequate ontological justification. In this reply, I argue that in view of (1) the so-called redescription principle defended by Elder-Vass ought to be reformulated and renamed; that the conjunction of (1) and (2) renders social objects causally redundant; and that ontological individualism can be coherently formulated and theoretically justified within Elder-Vass’s own metaphysics of objects with causal powers.
-
(2013): Organizational social structures for software engineering. In: ACM Computing Surveys 46 (1), S. 1-35. DOI: 10.1145/2522968.2522971
Abstract: Software engineering evolved from a rigid process to a dynamic interplay of people (e.g., stakeholders or developers). Organizational and social literature call this interplay an Organizational Social Structure (OSS). Software practitioners still lack a systematic way to select, analyze, and support OSSs best fitting their problems (e.g., software development). We provide the state-of-the-art in OSSs, and discuss mechanisms to support OSS-related decisions in software engineering (e.g., choosing the OSS best fitting development scenarios). Our data supports two conclusions. First, software engineering focused on building software using project teams alone, yet these are one of thirteen OSS flavors from literature. Second, an emerging OSS should be further explored for software development: social networks. This article represents a first glimpse at OSS-aware software engineering, that is, to engineer software using OSSs best fit for the problem.
Keywords: Computerwissenschaft, cultural implications, governance, Human Factors, IMPACT, information trust, KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITIES, knowledge management, Management, model, NETWORKS, organizational decision-making, Organizational social structures, Organizational Social Structures (OSS), QUALITY, social adaptivity, social context, social networks, social structure, software organizations, software practice, user perspective, users, WORKCommunities 2011
-
Schutz, Alfred; Embree, Lester E. (Hg.) (2011): Phenomenology and the social sciences. Dordrecht: Springer (Phaenomenologica)
1998
-
(1998): Modelling social action for AI agents. In: Artificial Intelligence 103 (1), S. 157-182. DOI: 10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00056-3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00056-3 Abstract: In the new AI of the 90s an important stream is artificial social intelligence. In this work basic ontological categories for social action, structure, and mind are introduced. Sociality (social action, social structure) is let emerge from the action and intelligence of individual agents in a common world. Also some aspects of the way-down—how emergent collective phenomena shape the individual mind—are examined. First, interference and dependence are defined, and then different kinds of coordination (reactive versus anticipatory; unilateral versus bilateral; selfish versus collaborative) are characterised. “Weak social action”, based on beliefs about the mind of the other agents, and “strong social action”, based on goals about others' minds and their actions, are distinguished. Special attention is paid to Goal Delegation and Goal Adoption that are considered as the basic ingredients of social commitment and contract, and then of exchange, cooperation, group action, and organisation. Different levels of delegation and then of autonomy of the delegated agent are described; and different levels of goal-adoption are shown to characterise true collaboration. Social goals in the minds of the group members are argued to be the real glue of joint activity, and the notion of social commitment, as different from individual and from collective commitment, is underlined. The necessity for modelling social objective structures and constraints is emphasised and the “shared mind” view of groups and organisations is criticised. The spontaneous and unaware emergence of a dependence structure is explained, as well as its feedback on the participants' minds and behaviours. Critical observations are presented on current confusions such as that between “social” and “collective” action, or between communication and social action. The main claims of the paper are the following: (a) The real foundation of all sociality (cooperation, competition, groups, organisation, etc.) is the individual social action and mind. One cannot reduce or connect action at the collective level to action at the individual level unless one passes through the social character of the individual action, (b) Important levels of coordination and cooperation necessarily require minds and cognitive agents (beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.). (c) However, cognition, communication and agreement are not enough for modelling and implementing cooperation: emergent pre-cognitive structures and constraints should be formalised, and emergent forms of cooperation are needed also among planning and deliberative agents, (d) We are going towards a synthetic paradigm in AI and Cognitive Science, reconciling situatedness and plans, reactivity and mental representations, cognition, emergence and self-organisation.
- <<
- <
- 1