Alle Publikationen
- <<
- <
- 1
2018
-
(2018): An architecture for ethical robots inspired by the simulation theory of cognition. In: COGNITIVE SYSTEMS RESEARCH 48, S. 56-66. DOI: 10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.04.002
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.04.002 Abstract: The expanding ability of robots to take unsupervised decisions renders it imperative that mechanisms are in place to guarantee the safety of their behaviour. Moreover, intelligent autonomous robots should be more than safe; arguably they should also be explicitly ethical. In this paper, we put forward a method for implementing ethical behaviour in robots inspired by the simulation theory of cognition. In contrast to existing frameworks for robot ethics, our approach does not rely on the verification of logic statements. Rather, it utilises internal simulations which allow the robot to simulate actions and predict their consequences. Therefore, our method is a form of robotic imagery. To demonstrate the proposed architecture, we implement a version of this architecture on a humanoid NAO robot so that it behaves according to Asimov’s laws of robotics. In a series of four experiments, using a second NAO robot as a proxy for the human, we demonstrate that the Ethical Layer enables the robot to prevent the human from coming to harm in simple test scenarios. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
2016
-
(2016) : Which robot am I thinking about? The impact of action and appearance on people’s evaluations of a moral robot: 2016 11th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI): Christchurch, New Zealand: IEEE Press, S. 125-132
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/HRI.2016.7451743 Abstract: In three studies we found further evidence for a previously discovered Human-Robot (HR) asymmetry in moral judgments: that people blame robots more for inaction than action in a moral dilemma but blame humans more for action than inaction in the identical dilemma (where inaction allows four persons to die and action sacrifices one to save the four). Importantly, we found that people’s representation of the “robot” making these moral decisions appears to be one of a mechanical robot. For when we manipulated the pictorial display of a verbally described robot, people showed the HR asymmetry only when making judgments about a mechanical-looking robot, not a humanoid robot. This is the first demonstration that robot appearance affects people’s moral judgments about robots.
Keywords: Anthropomorphism, Artificial intelligence, Context, Ethics, HR asymmetry, Human Factors, Humanoid Robots, human-robot asymmetry, human-robot interaction, ieee xplore, Machine morality, mechanical robot, mechanical-looking robot, Moral & Ethik, moral decisions, Moral judgments, moral psychology, moral robot, pictorial display, PSYCHOLOGY, Rails, Robot Ethics, social aspects of automation, verbally described robot 2015
-
(2015): A prospective framework for the design of ideal artificial moral agents: Insights from the science of heroism in humans. In: Minds and Machines: Journal for Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy and Cognitive Science 25 (1), S. 57-71. DOI: 10.1007/s11023-015-9361-2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-015-9361-2 Abstract: The growing field of machine morality has becoming increasingly concerned with how to develop artificial moral agents. However, there is little consensus on what constitutes an ideal moral agent let alone an artificial one. Leveraging a recent account of heroism in humans, the aim of this paper is to provide a prospective framework for conceptualizing, and in turn designing ideal artificial moral agents, namely those that would be considered heroic robots. First, an overview of what it means to be an artificial moral agent is provided. Then, an overview of a recent account of heroism that seeks to define the construct as the dynamic and interactive integration of character strengths (e.g., bravery and integrity) and situational constraints that afford the opportunity for moral behavior (i.e., moral affordances). With this as a foundation, a discussion is provided for what it might mean for a robot to be an ideal moral agent by proposing a dynamic and interactive connectionist model of robotic heroism. Given the limited accounts of robots engaging in moral behavior, a case for extending robotic moral capacities beyond just being a moral agent to the level of heroism is supported by drawing from exemplar situations where robots demonstrate heroism in popular film and fiction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
2010
-
(2010): A conceptual and computational model of moral decision making in human and artificial agents. In: Topics in cognitive science 2 (3), S. 454-485. DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01095.x
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01095.x Abstract: Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in general, comprehensive models of human cognition. Such models aim to explain higher‐order cognitive faculties, such as deliberation and planning. Given a computational representation, the validity of these models can be tested in computer simulations such as software agents or embodied robots. The push to implement computational models of this kind has created the field of artificial general intelligence (AGI). Moral decision making is arguably one of the most challenging tasks for computational approaches to higher‐order cognition. The need for increasingly autonomous artificial agents to factor moral considerations into their choices and actions has given rise to another new field of inquiry variously known as Machine Morality, Machine Ethics, Roboethics, or Friendly AI. In this study, we discuss how LIDA, an AGI model of human cognition, can be adapted to model both affective and rational features of moral decision making. Using the LIDA model, we will demonstrate how moral decisions can be made in many domains using the same mechanisms that enable general decision making. Comprehensive models of human cognition typically aim for compatibility with recent research in the cognitive and neural sciences. Global workspace theory, proposed by the neuropsychologist Bernard Baars (1988), is a highly regarded model of human cognition that is currently being computationally instantiated in several software implementations. LIDA (Franklin, Baars, Ramamurthy, & Ventura, 2005) is one such computational implementation. LIDA is both a set of computational tools and an underlying model of human cognition, which provides mechanisms that are capable of explaining how an agent’s selection of its next action arises from bottom‐up collection of sensory data and top‐down processes for making sense of its current situation. We will describe how the LIDA model helps integrate emotions into the human decision‐making process, and we will elucidate a process whereby an agent can work through an ethical problem to reach a solution that takes account of ethically relevant factors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords: artificial general intelligence, Artificial intelligence, Cognition, computational model, Computational modeling, Computer Simulation, conceptual model, Decision Making, global workspace theory, Humans, intelligent agents, machine ethics, Machine morality, MODELS, Moral & Ethik, moral decision making, Morality, Morals, Psychological 2009
-
(2009): Moral Machines. Teaching Robots Right From Wrong. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press
Abstract: The human‐built environment is increasingly being populated by artificial agents that, through artificial intelligence (AI), are capable of acting autonomously. The software controlling these autonomous systems is, to‐date, “ethically blind” in the sense that the decision‐making capabilities of such systems does not involve any explicit moral reasoning. The title Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong refers to the need for these increasingly autonomous systems (robots and software bots) to become capable of factoring ethical and moral considerations into their decision making. The new field of inquiry directed at the development of artificial moral agents is referred to by a number of names including machine morality, machine ethics, roboethics, or artificial morality. Engineers exploring design strategies for systems sensitive to moral considerations in their choices and actions will need to determine what role ethical theory should play in defining control architectures for such systems.
- <<
- <
- 1