Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): Towards a framework for computational persuasion with applications in behaviour change1. In: Argument & Computation 9 (1), S. 15-40. DOI: 10.3233/AAC-170032
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3233/AAC-170032 Abstract: Persuasion is an activity that involves one party trying to induce another party to believe something or to do something. It is an important and multifaceted human facility. Obviously, sales and marketing is heavily dependent on persuasion. But many other activities involve persuasion such as a doctor persuading a patient to drink less alcohol, a road safety expert persuading drivers to not text while driving, or an online safety expert persuading users of social media sites to not reveal too much personal information online. As computing becomes involved in every sphere of life, so too is persuasion a target for applying computer-based solutions. An automated persuasion system (APS) is a system that can engage in a dialogue with a user (the persuadee) in order to persuade the persuadee to do (or not do) some action or to believe (or not believe) something. To do this, an APS aims to use convincing arguments in order to persuade the persuadee. Computational persuasion is the study of formal models of dialogues involving arguments and counterarguments, of user models, and strategies, for APSs. A promising application area for computational persuasion is in behaviour change. Within healthcare organizations, government agencies, and non-governmental agencies, there is much interest in changing behaviour of particular groups of people away from actions that are harmful to themselves and/or to others around them.
Keywords: Argumentation, argumentation strategies, Argumentationsstrategie, Argumentationstheorie, automated persuasion system (APS), Automated Persuasion Systems (APS), computational models of argument, Computational persuasion, Computerbasierte Persuasion, dialogical argumentation, doppelter Treffer, Eliminierung von Fehlverhalten, Fehlverhalten, frame semantics, Gesellschaftsprofit, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Intellektualtechnik, Kognitionstheorie, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Persuasion, persuasion dialogues, persuasive arguments, Politik, probabilistic argumentation, Realtechnik, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialer Raum / Kultureller Kontext, Sprachroboter, Sprachverarbeitung, Technik, Überreden, Überzeugung, Umgangsformen, Verführung -
(2018): Argumentation mining. How can a machine acquire common sense and world knowledge?. In: Argument & Computation 9 (1), S. 1-14. DOI: 10.3233/AAC-170025Keywords: Allgemeiner Sinn, Ambiguität, Argumentation, argumentation mining, Argumentationssuche, Argumentationstheorie, argumentative text processing, Common Sense, Deep Learning, fortgeschrittene interaktive Geräte, frame semantics, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Lebenswissen, Linguistik, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Natural language understanding, Neural Networks, Realtechnik, representation learning, Sprachverarbeitung, Sprachverstehen, Technik, unsupervised, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten, Weltwissen, world knowledge
2016
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(2016): Politeness Judgments in Personal Relationships. In: Journal of Language and Social Psychology 16 (3), S. 297-325. DOI: 10.1177/0261927X970163003
Abstract: Brown and Levinson's politeness theory specifies five strategies for achieving politeness. Although the strategies are presented as ordered and mutually exclusive, there is reason to believe that they are neither The authors offer an alternative means of classifying requests that is grounded in the phenomenology of the social actor and depends on three message features: explicitness, dominance, and argument. Separate samples of judges viewed video clips of one college student attempting to influence another and provided judgments of politeness (n = 100), explicitness and overall dominance (n = 435), linguistic dominance (n = 80), or argument (n = 60). A regression analysis predicting politeness was conducted using message as the unit of analysis. The results showed a strong, negative relationship between politeness and dominance and weaker;positive associations with explicitness and argument.
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(2016): The Effects of (Un-)Fairness and (Im-)Politeness on the Evaluation of Argumentative Communication. In: Journal of Language and Social Psychology 14 (3), S. 260-288. DOI: 10.1177/0261927X95143002
Abstract: The studies reported here were carried out in order to test whether people in everyday argumentative interactions evaluate contributions according to the fairness criterion of argumentational integrity The hypotheses were (a) that violations of the fairness criterion are conspicuous, Ib) that such violations are negatively evaluated, and (c) that in the case of specific violations (Standards 1 to 5), people distinguish between impolite and unfair utterances. Ib test these hypotheses, an incompletely crossed two-factorial design with the factors (un;)fairness and (im-)politeness (unfair/impolite, unfair/polite, fair/impolite) was used, employing the scenario approach; its suitability was confirmed in the first (preliminary) study (N = 54). In the main study, all three hypotheses were largely confirmed (N = 119); the study also yielded information on additional factors influencing diagnosis and evaluation, such as type of unfairness or the participants' age and level of schooling.
2010
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(2010): Plurale Weltinterpretationen und Transdifferenz: Dominanz- und Interaktionsmodell in der alltäglichen Praxis der West-Tyva in Süd-Sibirien. In: Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 135 (2), S. 305-336
Abstract: This article analyses the flexible way of handling plural models of world interpretation in West Tyvan daily practice. Based on fieldwork in the Republic of Tyva (Russian Federation) in 20042005, it is part of a research project that led to a dissertation submitted to Leipzig University in 2010. At least two models of world interpretation could be identified. Both exist as realities of equal value but can structurally be differentiated as "model of dominance" and "model of interaction." The first stresses "the human dominance over the environment, seen as a series of more or less passive objects of human agency," the second emphasizes the "interaction in a world enclosing humans and consisting of both human and non-human subjects." Both models are coherent systems and belong in equal degree to the repertoire of knowledge, behaviour and acting of West Tyvan agents. To them, these models count as equal and mutually contradictory. The models compete and oppose each other, but form a continuum within a single person to the effect that the human agent is constantly positioning itself, depending on situation and context. The empirical material demonstrates that West Tyvans use these models in various ways - replacing, complementing and mixing them according to their needs in specific contexts.
1999
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(1999): Lass uns richtig streiten. Vom Wortgefecht zum Dialog. Original: The argument culture. Moving from debate to dialogue.. 1. Aufl.. München: Goldmann
Abstract: Es wird die Eingangsthese formuliert, dass die westliche Gesellschaft zunehmend von einer Streitkultur durchdrungen ist. Als Resultat wird eine kriegerische Atmosphäre konstatiert, die oftmals mehr Probleme schafft, denn löst. Wie tief ein solches Frontdenken im Kopf jedes einzelnen verankert ist und wie dadurch ein kreatives Denken behindert wird, wird nun aufzuzeigen versucht. Dem werden alternative Umgangsformen mit Meinungsverschiedenheiten in anderen Kulturen gegenübergestellt. Schließlich werden Anregungen gegeben, neue Modelle entwickeln, die zu einem besseren gegenseitigem Verständnis und damit letztlich zu einer Problemlösung beitragen sollen.
1983
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(1983): Moral Arguments and Social Contexts. In: The Journal of Philosophy 80 (10). DOI: 10.2307/2026154
Abstract: Virginia Held believes it possible for intellectuals to speak from a point of view independet of existing social arrangements and interests, from which as purely external critics they should articulate for society the standards that genuine moral and aesthetiv worth decree. The issue between her and Richard Rorty turns on whether a necessary precondition of this possibility can be satisfied. Held's thesis requires that conclusions concerning genuine moral worth can be devised and justified, independently of any appeal to de facto beliefs, conventions, and institutions. This is what Rorty denies. Held's thesis also requires that everyone else, plain persons who are not intellectuals, have good reason to attend to declarations by intellectuals. This I deny for reasons which undermine Rorty's argument as well as Held's. What precludes modern intellectuals from being justly accorded the role and the responsibilities assigned to them by Held is the extent of intellectual and social dissensus. On every substantive social and moral issue intellectuals appear on opposing sides: Sowell versus Thorow, Scholem versus Arendt, Bethe versus Teller. If Held's thesis is that plain persons should attend only to intellectuals whose arguments are sound, then the intellectual task of identifying sound arguments devolves on the plain person, and any clear distinction between intellectuals and nonintellectuals is obliterated.
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